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Abstract 
The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) has been widely noted for its contribution to 2000 Review 
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The 
NAC played a bridge-building role to negotiate a consensus between the nuclear weapons 
states (NWS) and the non-aligned movement (NAM). While the outcome, document known 
as the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament is a significant achievement, it is the 
coalition strategy employed by the middle power states that is the most important 
contribution to the study of nuclear disarmament diplomacy. 
This research proposes that middle power states, such as those involved in the NAC, are 
effective advocates of the emerging international norm of nuclear disarmament when acting 
in coalition with other like-minded middle powers. This research aims to test the capacity of 
these states to develop the case for nuclear disarmament, persuasively reject or rebut 
opposing arguments, and constrain the nuclear policies of more powerful states. This thesis 
holds that the NAC is one example of a larger trend in international disarmament diplomacy 
of using middle power coalitions to generate disarmament momentum. The middle power 
coalition approach is identifiable in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons disarmament 
efforts as well as in the antipersonnellandmines, small arms and light weapons, and cluster 
munitions disarmament processes. 
Martha Finnemore and Katherine Sikkink's 'norm life cycle' in Interna'tional Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change provides a mechanism which can be use to explain how 
new international norms can develop and is therefore, an appropriate frame of reference as 
nuclear disarmament is best characterised as an emerging international norm. Analysis of the 
case studies is made possible by integrating the outcomes of the theoretical discussion into a 
template of moderator variables. These variables determine the strength of the relationship 
between use of the coalition approach and the impact of middle powers as disarmament norm 
entrepreneurs. 
Middle power states that employ the coalition approach have adopted a variety of strategies 
including state-sponsored and state-led efforts, making extensive use of non-governmental 
partnerships. This research establishes the factors that contribute to successful middle power 
coalition disarmament advocacy, the international conditions in which these coalitions are 
likely to be successful and the capacity of the states involved to mitigate and respond to 
challenges as they present themselves. 
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Introduction 
The collapse of the 2005 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the result ofa procedural stalemate; 
however, this procedural wrangling indicated much deeper frustrations regarding the current 
operation and future direction of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The failure of the 
conference to agree to an agenda was due to a small number of states that were able to 
dominate the debate by shifting focus to auxiliary issues. 1 As a part ofthis group, the nuclear 
weapons states (NWS) the United States and France, obstructed discussion on the 
implementation of the NPT Article VI nuclear disarmament obligation.2 This unwillingness 
to acknowledge the agreements and commitments made at the 1995 Review and Extension' 
Conference and the 2000 RevCon compromised the NPT states parties' capacity to address 
the serious proliferation challenges from Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea in 2005.3 This 
conference did little to dispel non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) concerns that non-
proliferation obligations were given priority over nuclear disarmament, reinforcing the 
cleavages that persist between the traditional voting blocs (the Non Aligned Movement 
(NAM) and the NWS regarding the onus of responsibility to implement the requirements of 
Article Vr.4 Given the absence of bridge-building states at this forum and the escalating 
insecurity within the non-proliferation regime, questions regarding the capacity of state 
parties to reconcile the competing priorities of the two blocs and pursue a balanced approach 
to the three pillars of the NPT (disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear energy) have 
taken on a renewed urgency. 5 
I R. Johnson, "Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed," Disarmament 
Diplomacy, 80 (Autumn 2005), retrieved August 20, 2009 from 
<http://www.acronym.org.uk!dd/dd80/80npt.htm> . 
2 J. Cirincione, "Failure in New York," Nuclear Policy: Proliferation Analysis, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (June 7, 2005), retrieved June 23,2009 from 
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id= 17042>., and H. Muller, "The 
2005 NPT Review Conference: Reasons and Consequences of Failure and Options for Repair," Weapons of 
Mass Destnlction Commission Paper no 31, Stockholm, Sweden (August 2005), p. 6, retrieved September 12, 
2009 from <http://www.wmdcommission.org/filesIN031.pdf>. 
3 J. Cirincione, "Failure in New York". 
4 The implementation of Article VI involves reducing the level of armaments and reliance on these weapons in 
security policies; yet, as states such as the NWS argue, it is just as necessary to implement the conditions that 
would enable such reductions to .have a positive impact on international security. 
5 This insecurity stems from the prospect of nuclear terrorism, the high operational readiness levels and the 
offensive nuclear postures maintained by the NWS. W. Potter, P. Lewis, G. Mukhatzhanova, and M. Pomper, 
The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Deconstrllcting Consensus, CNS Special Report (June 17,2010), James 
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute ofInternational Studies, p. 11, retrieved August 
8, 2010 from <cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfsll 00617_ npt_ 2010 _summary. pdf> 
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The bridging the nuclear disarmament divide 
It is in this context the New Agenda Coalition's (NAC) contribution to the 2000 RevCon is 
significant. The NAC, comprised of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South 
Africa and Sweden,6 catalysed a diplomatic breakthrough to produce a consensus outcome 
known as the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament (13 Steps). This coalition took 
advantage of the heightened tensions and increased expectations held by many parties and 
observers in the lead up to the 2000 RevCon. The NAC negotiated a consensus between the 
NWS and the NAM by providing a policy bridge that spanned the politicised disarmament 
divide. While the 'success' of this coalition was ultimately short-lived and many of the 13 
Steps are now out of date, as an effective negotiating nexus in 2000, the NAC demonstrated 
the potential for a diplomatic resolution to the disarmament dilemma. While the 2005 
RevCon breakdown cannot be attributed to the absence the NAC alone, no state or group of 
states was able to provide viable forward-looking strategies or unite the majority of states 
around a middle ground. 
It is the contribution of this coalition to the 2000 outcome that has provided the impetus for 
the research in this thesis. This research will consider whether middle power states such as 
those involved in the NAC are effective advocates ofthe emerging international norm of 
nuclear disarmament when acting in coalition with other like-minded middle powers. The 
following chapters will consider the factors that contribute to, or constrain middle power 
disarmament diplomacy and the impact of the middle power coalition in determining the 
success of norm advocacy. 7 
Middle power coalitions and disarmament advocacy 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the NAC, an exploration of the diplomatic strategies 
employed by middle power states has real potential to make a significant contribution to the 
study of nuclear disarmament diplomacy. This middle power coalition challenged the 
6 Slovenia was initially a party to the coalition but withdrew in 1998 citing NATO pressures. R. Green, Fast 
Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons: the Middle Powers Initiative, The Middle Powers Initiative: Cambridge, 
Massachusetts (1998), p. 12. 
7 See C. Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, MacMillan: London, (1984) and C. Pratt, Middle 
Power Internationalism: The north-south dimension, Kingston & Montreal: McGill- Queen's University Press, 
(1990) as early examples of the use of the term 'middle power' in academic literature; however, the term has 
been in common usage in foreign policy discourse since the end of World War II. 
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commonly held view that "the powerful do as they will and the weak do as they must.,,8 
Andrew F. Cooper has suggested that middle powers states have received significant 
attention as these states have increasingly become active leaders in the development of 
normative agendas in selected areas where they have specialised interests and task related 
experience.9 Despite the fact that the foreign policies of the great powers continue to 
dominate and shape the international system, that these states are no longer the "only source 
of initiative in the international order.,,10 This research will focus on a core group of middle 
power states which have repeatedly demonstrated a capacity to tailor their collective 
diplomatic actions to take advantage of the opportunities provided by negotiated regimes and 
institutions, advancing their collective agenda by exerting an influence that is far beyond the 
individual capacity of each state. 11 Middle power states are most often noted as having 
achieved significant success in 'second and third agenda' items including economic, 
environmental and human rights issues. 12 More importantly though, these states have also 
been active in 'humanitarian disarmament' campaigns including antipersonnellandmines, 
small arms and light weapons and cluster munitions disarmament. Through the skilful 
framing of the nuclear disarmament debate, this same group of middle power states has also 
been able to influence the 'hard security' issue of nuclear disarmament. 
This thesis holds that the NAC is one example of a larger trend in international disarmament 
diplomacy of using middle power coalitions to generate disarmament momentum. This 
coalition approach is the most remarkable and innovative characteristic of middle power 
diplomacy and is integral to the success of a number of middle power efforts to advance 
disarmament. These states are more likely to be effective advocates for nuclear disarmament 
when acting as a part of a coalition. Incidentally, these states are motivated to adopt this 
approach due to the limited resources and systemic constraints they face. Engagement in 
8 C. Ingebritsen, 'Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics', Cooperation and Conflict: 
Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, 37, 1 (2002), p.11. 
9 A. F. Cooper, Niche diplomacy: middle powers after the Cold War, Pa1grave Macmillan: Hampshire 
(November 1997), p. 6. 
10 A. F. Cooper, Niche diplomacy: middle powers after the Cold War, p. 1. 
II See for example O. Young in "Political Leadership and regime Formation: on the Development ofInstitutions 
in International Society," International Organisation, 45, 3, (1991) p. 287, regarding the potential for states to 
exercise of alternative leadership strategies in negotiated settlements. Such leadership is not necessarily derived 
from than hegemonic or structural power. 
12 A. F. Cooper, R. Higgot and K. R. Nossa1 refer to 'second agenda' items as economic issues and 'third 
agenda' items as the environment and human rights in Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a 
Changing World Order, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press (1993). See also M.A. Rudderham, 
"Middle Power Pull: Can Middle Powers use Public Diplomacy to Ameliorate the Image of the West?" YCISS 
Working Paper Number 46, (February 2008), p. 18, retrieved March 12,2009 from 
<http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-02880.pdf>. 
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such coalitions provides these middle power states with a competitive advantage as the 
coalition creates a platform from which to leverage their positions and maximise the utility of 
niche areas of expertise. 13 As the unit of analysis, this coalition aspect represents a relatively 
novel way of interacting with the global power structure. 14 While the role of middle power 
coalitions has been explored by a number of scholars the conclusions of these studies have 
not yet been fully explored in the context of nuclear disarmament. 15 
Establishing a theoretical framework 
Chapter Two of this thesis constructs a conceptual framework to support the central 
hypothesis that middle power states can effectively promote nuclear disarmament when 
acting in coalition with other like-minded middle powers. This chapter builds on the wealth 
of literature on norms and the dynamics of disarmament process and provides a basis for the 
following research. This research aims to test the capacity of these states to develop the case 
for nuclear disarmament, persuasively reject or rebut opposing arguments, and constrain the 
nuclear policies of more powerful states. This chapter establishes a theoretical foundation for 
this research by reviewing and evaluating the current constructivist literature on international 
norms and nuclear non-proliferation regime dynamics to explain nuclear disarmament from 
the perspective of an emerging international norm. 16 Martha Finnemore and Katherine 
Silddnk's 'norm life cycle' in International Norm Dynamics and Political Change provides a 
mechanism to explain how new international norms can develop and is therefore, an 
appropriate frame of reference as nuclear disarmament is best characterised as an emerging 
13 G. Evans and B. Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations In the World of the 1990s, Second Edition, 
Melbourne University Press (1991), p. 27. 
14 "Leveraging Soft Power Currency Against Hard Power Weapons: The role of middle powers in the 
international nuclear disarmament (Interview with James Wurst, Program Director of the Middle Powers 
Initiative)," Public Diplomacy Magazine (In Practice), 2, (Summer 2009), retrieved December 20,2009 from 
<URL: http://publicdiplomacymagazine.comlpublic-diplomacy-in-practice/leveraging-soft-power-currency-
against-hard-power-weapons/>. 
15 See for example R. A. Higgott and A. F. Cooper, "Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: 
Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations," International Organization, 44,4, 
(Autumn, 1990), p. 589., and K. Rutherford, S. Brem and R. Matthew (eds.) Reframing the Agenda: The Impact 
ofNGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security, Praeger: Westport CT, (2003). 
16 Recent publications suggest that this is an area of increasing interest. See M. Hanson, "The Advocacy States: 
Their Normative Role before and after the U.S. Call for Nuclear Elimination," The Nonproliferation Review, 17, 
1, (March 2010), p. 71., M. R. Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social 
Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness," International Studies Review, 10, (2008), p. 420., and 
Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint, University of Georgia Press, (2009), and W. 
Clarke, "Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and Failure," 
Hertie School of Governance- Working papers, No. 35, (July 2008), p.8, retrieved October 2,2008 from 
<www.hertie-school.orglbinaries/addonl650_hsog_wp_no.35.pdf>. 
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international norm. 17 This norms approach is valuable as it explains the concepts used in the 
hypothesis such as the role of norm entrepreneurs (in this case the middle power states) in the 
promotion of emerging norms through multilateral organisational platforms (middle power 
coalitions). Norms theory also outlines the theoretical issues that may challenge the 
hypothesis and provides the theoretical tools to understand how and why middle powers can 
influence regime dynamics and constrain NWS policy. 
Analysis of the case studies is made possible by integrating the outcomes of the theoretical 
discussion into template of moderator variables. These variables determine the strength of the 
relationship between use of the coalition approach and the impact of middle powers as 
disarmament norm entrepreneurs. These moderator vari~bles draw on Warren Clarke's work 
in Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success 
and Failure, which compares conventional disarmament transnational advocacy networks in 
the context of norm advocacy; 18 however, these variables are also reflect the observable 
characteristics of the NAC and have been refined through an iterative process. 19 This method 
has served to sharpen the variable definitions and strengthens the internal validity of this 
theory. The variables are: (1) the capacity of the norm entrepreneurs, (2) the constraints of the 
international environment, (3) the characteristics of the issue, (4) the framing the issue and 
the development of the case for disarmament by norm entrepreneurs. These variables enable 
controlled cross-study comparisons to be made between the very different middle power 
coalitions. 
Research outline 
Chapter three will consider whether middle powers have been effective nuclear disarmament 
advocates and wi11look to middle power involvement in the NAC. Assessment of 'effective 
norm promotion' in this context will be based on the capacity of these states (in coalition) to 
influence a critical mass of states and/or NWS nuclear policy. This example validates but also 
qualifies the hypothesis as the NAC success is subject to certain conditions. The NAC 
contribution demonstrated potential but fell short expectations and there are a number of 
areas where this coalition could have improved their advocacy. The coalition hypothesis is 
17 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International 
Organization, 52, 4, (Autumn 1998), p. 895. 
18 W. Clarke, "Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and 
Failure," p.14. 
19 K. M. Eisenhardt, "Building Theories from Case Study Research," The Academy of Management Review, 14, 
4, (October 1989), p. 541. 
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supported by the fact the NAC was not an isolated incident, but rather, elements of this 
strategy have been employed widely to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda. This 
suggests that there are a variety of diplomatic strategies that are available to middle power 
states that employ the coalition approach. 
Chapter Four considers the North Atlantic Treaty Association Group of Five (NATO-5) as a 
middle power nuclear security coalition as well as the taking into account the similarity that 
middle power coalitions have with transnational advocacy networks and international 
commissions as middle power state-sponsored efforts. This chapter concludes that the Middle 
Powers Initiative (MPI), the Seven Nation Initiative (7NI) and the middle power sponsored 
independent nuclear commissions compliment and reflect core aspects of the state-led 
coalition approach. This chapter highlights the need for pragmatism in middle power 
diplomacy, given the limited capacity of these states to find and maintain influence in an 
often hostile normative and policy environment. The success of these endeavours hinges on 
the capacity of the middle power states to frame the norm and tailor their advocacy to suit the 
environment; however success is determined not only by cooperative efforts, but by insuring 
the outcomes of these initiatives against the inevitable limits these states face. 
Chapter Five will consider other examples of the trend of using middle power coalitions to 
generate disarmament momentum in the conventional and (non-nuclear) weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) disarmament movements. The middle power coalition approach can be 
identified in antipersonnellandmines, small arms and light weapons, and cluster munitions 
disarmament processes, as well as chemical and biological weapons disarmament efforts, 
lending further support to the hypothesis. Middle power coalitions in the conventional 
weapons disarmament campaigns have achieved some significant successes, suggesting that 
in the presence of other political conditions the middle power disarmament advocacy could 
take a very different course. Chapter Five considers middle power coalition efforts in 
chemical and biological weapons disarmament which share more similarities with nuclear 
disarmament by virtue of the strategic nature of these weapons. These examples suggest a 
different, technical and more pragmatic approach to that undertaken in nuclear disarmament. 
Lastly, in Chapter Six this research will consider the capacity of individual states to tailor 
their diplomacy to suit the international conditions and the potential to create develop the 
conditions that would enable the success of middle power coalition. 
6 
Having established the factors that contribute to successful middle power coalition 
disarmament advocacy, the international conditions in which these coalitions are likely to be 
successful, and the capacity of the states involved to mitigate and respond to challenges as 
they present themselves, the concluding discussion in Chapter Seven will address the means 
by which future efforts could more accurately respond to the needs of current nuclear 
disarmament context. Ronal M. Behringer suggests that "it may be possible for the middle 
powers to overcome great power opposition to an initiative through their choice of an 
appropriate diplomatic strategy.,,20 There are opportunities for middle power coalition 
advocacy to advance the disarmament agenda, as M.A. Rudderham suggests, "this potential is 
going largely unrealized.,,21This trend towards coalition activity has demonstrated a broad 
spectrum of plausible diplomatic strategies and suggests that middle power states could to 
assume greater responsibility for creating the international conditions that will enable future 
nuclear disarmament efforts to succeed.22 Moreover, in more optimal conditions this 
diplomatic strategy could form a mechanism to broker a much needed resolution to the 
current disarmament impasse. 
This analysis and the subsequent recommendations must be mindful not to attribute more 
influence than is warranted to the middle power coalitions, or claim greater influence than 
these state are capable of exhibiting. Therefore, the recommendations aim to extract the 
greatest advantage out of the resources and capacity these states currently demonstrate. The 
recommendations will suggest a range, or spectrum of possible options applicable for future 
middle power activity in the context of current nuclear disarmament dynamics derived from 
the previous examples which could enable these states to make more efficient use of their 
resources. 
20 R. M. Behringer, "Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda," Cooperation and Conflict, 40, 
3, (2005), p. 318. 
21 M. A. Rudderham, "Middle Power Pull: Can Middle Powers use Public Diplomacy to Ameliorate the 
Image of the West?" p. 19. 
22 Director General S. Kongstad, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seminar: A Nordic Initiative for 
Nuclear Abolition, Oslo (April 15, 2009), p. 4, retrieved May 20,2009 from 
<http://www.converge.org.nz!pma/nucnord09 .pdf>. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
This chapter constructs a conceptual framework to support the hypothesis that middle power 
states can effectively promote nuclear disarmament when acting in a coalition with other like-
minded middle powers. It establishes a theoretical foundation for the following research on 
the emerging norm of nuclear disarmament, placing this in the context of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. Middle power disarmament advocacy is also cast as a part of a broader 
movement in the international community to disarm certain categories of weapons deemed 
inhumane or contrary to international humanitarian law. This chapter reviews contemporary 
constructivist analysis on the non-proliferation regime, revealing the influence of social 
construction, a key tenant of constructivism, on NPT member states' decision-making. This 
research explains how calculated and rational decisions are not only shaped by power and 
reason, but also socially derived constraints on state behaviour. States refer to a number of 
norms to interpret the complex web of non-proliferation regime political arrangements and 
treaty law. Current literature on the role of these norms such as non-proliferation, nuclear 
restraint or the norm of non-use (no first-use) provides insight into the factors that cause 
NWS to accept constraints on their capacity to manufacture, deploy and operate their nuclear 
arms. This research has a number of conclusions for the study of middle power nuclear 
disarmament diplomacy, as similar drivers may influence and possibly constrain the NWS 
decision-making on the nuclear disarmament issue. 
Constructivism 
This theoretical perspective is valuable as it provides a lens through which to view and 
analyse the evolution of international norms including the gradual emergence of nuclear 
disarmament as a foreign policy imperative. As a macro-theoretical perspective 
constructivism not only explains the role of normative constraints, but more importantly, 
illustrates how this normative environment can change over time. This is critical when 
analysing nuclear disarmament as the observable empirical patterns that signify progress on 
nuclear disarmament (such as new agreements that implement arms reductions, increased 
verification or transparency in state nuclear policies), represent a changing relationship 
between the norms of nuclear weapons possession and international security. The classical 
theories, liberalism, realism and later variants, are more adept at explaining stable 
relationships and underestimate the role or impact of new or evolving ideas and norms on 
state practice, because norms "affect the behaviour of states independent of structure and 
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material factors.'.23 Constructivists confer upon norms an influence that has often been 
positioned as being in opposition to these classical theories. For example, Katherine Sikkink 
suggests that realists dismiss the role of social construction "as marginal, insignificant or an 
ideological cover beneath which economic groups or hegemonic countries pursue their 
interests.,,24 Ann FIorini states that liberals dismiss norms approaches as being determined by 
factors exogenous to the theory.25 Hedley Bull goes so far as to suggest that there is an 
antagonism between norms and traditional theories, suggesting that norms, in their logical 
extreme, are "subversive to the whole principle that mankind should be organised as a society 
of sovereign states.,,26 Despite this theoretical antagonism, analysis of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime can benefit from the application of a constructivist perspective. In this 
context, constructivism can compliment classical analysis by highlighting an additional layer 
of socially derived information that states take into consideration when constructing nuclear 
policy. 
Norms in international relations 
Norms constrain nuclear decision-making as they shape the way individuals and communities 
view the world around them, subsequently affecting decisions on the most appropriate 
courses of action. Political norms do not proscribe state behaviour in absolute terms; 
however, they are powerful tools that impact decision-making and analysis. Norms provide a 
framework for effective and efficient decision-making by limiting the scope of rational 
behaviour.27 Edna Ullmann-Margalit suggests that norms enable agents to cooperate and 
coordinate their actions in situations where the pursuit of self-interest prevents this. 28 As 
agreed standards of behaviour for appropriate actors of a given identity, political norms are 
technically non-binding, but are, in general, complied with because there is a sense of 
23 K. Sikkink, "Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights," Political Science 
and Politics, Vol. 31,3, (September 1998), p. 517. 
24 Ibid. 
25 A. FIorini, "The Evolution ofInternational Norms," International Studies Quarterly, 40, 3: Special Issue: 
Evolutionary Paradigms in the Social Sciences, (September 1996), p. 363. 
26 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press 
(1977), p. 146. 
27 See O. R. Young, 'The Politics ofInternational Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the 
Environment,' International Organization, 43, 3, (Summer 1989), p. 371. A norms approach complements 
liberal and realist thinking, by taking into account strategic and political necessity and tendency towards 
cooperation, by posing the condition of bounded rationality as a constraint on state decision making behaviour. 
28 E. Ullmann-Margalit, Game Theory and Ethics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved November 
12,2007 from <http://plato.stanford.edulentries/game-ethics/>. 
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obligation created by the shared nature of the assessment of appropriate behaviour. 29 
Violation of this behaviour often results in social (or political) sanction.3o States do not 
comply with norms because they are enforced, "but because they are seen as legitimate. ,,31 
Moreover, the absence of uniform compliance does not detract or weaken the norm, but is 
instead, a recognition that the standard exists, clarifying the status of outlier states, as well as 
"the steps required for their rehabilitation.,,32 
The role of norms in nuclear decision making 
The use of norms language is a relatively recent addition to international relations 
scholarship; however, it is now widely used to explain the socialising impact of membership 
of international regimes and organisations, and has been aptly applied to explain the 
relationship between the states and the complex political agreements of the non-proliferation 
regime. Research on the drivers of proliferation and the motivations for weapons acquisition 
is valuable to this study of nuclear disarmament. It reveals that the 'the value and utility' of 
nuclear weapons is derived from perceptions of political power, prestige and legitimacy, and 
the weapons more abstract value as political currency, as much as strategic security 
concerns. 33 Work on the norms of non-proliferation, non-use and nuclear restraint is critical 
to understanding the dynamics of the non-proliferation regime, particularly where states 
adopt policies that appear at the outset to be detrimental, limiting the exercise of state power. 
In many cases states refrain from weapons acquisition within the regime because (amongst 
other material and strategic benefits) this behaviour offers international standing. 
Furthermore, norms research reveals that the influence of social construction (soft power, 
persuasion and the value oflegitimacy) on nuclear decision-making is pervasive, constraining 
29 D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal 
System, Oxford University Press, (2003), p. 11. Dinah Shelton suggests that this distinction is not easy to make, 
but is based upon the assumption that there are no enforced legal consequences for the breach of a political 
norm. See also P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 
New York: Columbia University Press, (1996). 
30 A. FIorini, "The Evolution ofInternational Nonns," p. 364. 
31 Ibid. 
32 M. Krepon, "George Bunn, The Norm Builder," ArmsControlWonkblog entry, (January 21,2010), retrieved 
January 25,2010 from <URL: http://www.annscontrolwonk.com>. 
33 The reference here is to both domestic and international perceptions of political power and prestige. S. D. 
Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb, " International Security, 
21,3, (Winter 1996-1997), p. 54, W. C. Potter and G. Mukhatzhanova, "Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review 
Essay," International Security, 33, 1, (Summer 2008), p. 165., and A. Harrington de Santana "Nuclear Weapons 
as the Currency of Power: Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force," The Nonproliferation Review, 16,3, 
(November 2009), p. 326. 
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a state's capacity to test, acquire, modernise, expand or use their arsenals. 34 The same logic 
explains why the perception of regime compliance (ifnot actual compliance), with the Article 
VI disarmament obligation, is valuable for the NWS, as it reinforces the 'responsible NWS' 
mantle. 
Norms language is the most appropriate point of departure for this research on nuclear 
disarmament; nonetheless, the fact that norms influence but do not determine behavioural 
outcomes must be emphasised. The value of this perspective is not derived from a conclusive 
explanation of how and why states that possess nuclear weapons (or states that rely on them 
for their deterrent value) will engage in a process of gradual reductions to nuclear zero. The 
nuc~ear disarmament obligation (as it currently exists) is a soft law obligation, and operates in 
a 'grey-area' of international relations as the exact nature of this obligation is subject to 
dispute. In reality, NWS nuclear decision-making is influenced by a wide range of factors 
(domestic politics, national security and the international strategic environment). It is a real 
challenge to locate a theory that has the sophistication to navigate the complicated dynamics 
of the non-proliferation regime. As Tanya Ogilvie-White has suggested, "nuclear intentions 
are notoriously difficult to divine.,,35 The value of this theoretical perspective lies in the fact 
that political and social norms can in some cases, be a precursor to legal and strategic 
developments. The influence of political (nuclear) norms increases as states comply with the 
norm over time, as illustrated by the non-use norm or the nuclear threshold, which have 
increased in salience over the previous 60 years. These norms also play an integral role in the 
interpretation and evolution of customary and international law. 36 While conclusions drawn 
from this analysis are vulnerable to dispute, the evolution of international norms provides an 
34 For the nuclear taboo see N. Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo," 
International Security, 29,4 (Spring 2005), p. 32, and T. V. Paul, "Taboo or tradition? The non-use of nuclear 
weapons in world politics, " Review of International Studies, 36, 85, (2010), p. 853. For the norm of nuclear 
restraint see M. R. Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to 
Understand Regime Effectiveness," and Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint, 
35 T. Ogilvie-White, "The Defiant States," The Nonproliferation Review, 17, 1 Special Issue (March 2010), p. 
118. 
36 Intemationallaw recognises non-binding influences on state behaviour. Norms inform and create new, 
playing three key roles. Firstly, state compliance with a widely recognised norm is considered as evidence of 
accepted customary law, or opinio juris (that which the state considers binding as law). Secondly, states are 
increasingly adopting texts that contain norms or statements of obligation, but which are not in legally binding 
form. These form 'soft law' political commitments (like the nuclear disarmament obligation in Article VI of the 
NPT), which are reliant on interpretation and political will for enforcement. Thirdly, superior or peremptory 
norms override existing law and are binding on all states. These norms are widely supported in the literature; 
however Dinah Shelton suggests that "little state practice or judicial opinion recognizes or gives legal effect to 
such norms." D. Shelton, Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International 
Legal System, p. 159. 
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important vehicle by which to initiate stronger compliance and enforcement mechanisms 
(that would contribute to disarmament). 
The norm life cycle 
Martha Finnemore and Katherine Silddnk's norm 'life cycle' provides a succinct explanation 
for the evolution of new standards of international behaviour. Finnemore and Silddnk explain 
the emergence of new norms with reference to the development of the norm 'life cycle.' This 
theory, presented in International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,37 involves three 
stages of norm evolution: norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalisation. They 
outline the role of the states involved at each stage of the cycle and the relative influence of 
the new norm on state interpretation of international obligations. 
The norm emergence phase of this cycle is characterised by norm entrepreneurs who are 
responsible for shaping and framing the new norm. This phase presents a mechanism by 
which middle powers can influence the development of new international norms by acting as 
norm entrepreneurs (through multilateral organisational platforms) and in doing so, these 
states can constrain NWS nuclear policies. These entrepreneurs have strong ideas about 
"appropriate behaviour in their community" and are critical to the promotion of a normative 
agenda as they often create the issues or draw attention to them through their active agency.38 
In this case it is middle powers who act through organisational platforms to convince "a 
critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms.,,39 These middle powers seek to 
convince a critical mass of states to not only support the passive proposition that world free 
of nuclear weapons is reasonable (in principle), but to actively engage in the disarmament 
process. Finnemore and Silddnk hold that once a critical mass has reached a tipping point, 
adherence spreads rapidly through the international community. To reach this point the norm 
is generally "institutionalised in specific sets of international rules and organisations,,4o which 
would be an indicator that the norm is fully internalised by the states party to those 
agreements. The last stage of internalisation involves the broad acceptance of the norm and is 
37 M. Finnemore and K. Silddnk, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," p.895. 
38 Ibid, p. 897. 
39 Ibid, p. 895. 
40 Ibid, p. 887. 
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"increasingly institutionalised in international law, multilateral organisations and in bilateral 
. foreign relations.,,41 
Disarmament as an emerging norm 
This thesis asserts the international norm of nuclear disarmament has not been fully 
internalised by all states. Although the concept of nuclear disarmament can be traced back to 
the Baruch Plan of 1946, and was institutionalised in Article VI of the NPT in 1969, the 
urgency of the obligation is disputed by the NWS (and NNWS states that rely on these 
weapons as a deterrent). The imperative to implement disarmament has chaJlenged but has 
not yet succeeded the norm of deterrence and mutually assured destruction, which has 
remained the dominant and accepted standard ofNWS behaviour. In the drafting the NPT, 
disarmament was a technical and political compromise between the NWS and the NNWS. 
The NPT neither established the disarmament norm, nor codified an a widely internalised 
norm, despite the fact that "norms against the possession, acquisition, or proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems are traditionally established 
through multilateral, legally binding treaties.,,42 While the majority of countries party to the 
NPT as NNWS have committed to refrain from weapons possession (and have done so in 
exchange for NWS commitment to progress on nuclear disarmament), this process was given 
little, if any currency by the NWS before the end of the Cold War. This thesis suggests that 
disarmament remains as an emerging norm as it has not yet reached a stage where a critical 
mass of states acknowledge disarmament as a "genuine policy imperative.,,43 This factor is 
necessary to generate the requisite political will to implement policies that contribute to 
disarmament. This proactive stance is only evident in the foreign policies of a select group of 
states that act as norm entrepreneurs. 
The critical mass 
As nuclear disarmament remains in the first stage of norm emergence, it is essential to 
persuade a critical mass of states before a norm can reach the tipping point and cascade 
rapidly through the international community. This point is a subject of debate, as the 
threshold for a critical mass of nuclear disarmament supporters appears to be particularly 
41 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," p. 900. 
42 J. Cirincione (ed.) "Appendix I: The International Non-Proliferation Regime," in Repairing the 
Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, New York: Routledge (2000), p. 283. 
43 R. Johnson, "Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed." 
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high. This is because of the characteristics of weapons possession (with relatively few, but 
powerful stockholders), the politics of extended deterrence and the consensus based decision-
making in disarmament forums such as the CD. These factors require more than a majority of 
NNWS to compel the major stockholders to commit to a phased approach to disarmament.44 
This high threshold is a challenge to the legitimacy of disarmament efforts as the NWS (and 
those that support extended deterrence) hold a pivotal position, imposing a heavier than usual 
burden of responsibility on norm advocates. The threshold for the 'tipping point' may have to 
include at least one NWS, and/or commitments from the states outside the treaty that possess 
nuclear weapons (India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan). This is in contrast to many other 
international norms which would be recognised to have 'cascaded' on a lesser majority, much 
earlier in the emergence phase. 
The logic of appropriateness 
Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that the "different social processes and logics of action at 
each stage in the cycle" indicate the manner in which states will interpret and respond to the 
norm as it evolves. They make a critical observation that the "completion of the life cycle is 
not an inevitable process.,,45 They acknowledge a number of important conditions that must 
be met before a new norm will be accepted by a critical mass of states. This suggests that 
middle power disarmament advocacy will be subject to a number of conditions.46 They 
recognise that a new norm will emerge from an existing 'logic of appropriateness' defined by 
prior norms. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen define the logic of appropriateness as "a 
perspective that sees human action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, 
organized into institutions.,,47 They suggest that actors in a given political community will 
justify and prescribe foreign policy to fit collective expectations. This pre-existing normative 
environment has two important consequences for the promotion of new norms; first, 
emerging norms will be successful when they are framed by norm entrepreneurs such that 
they are a logical extension of current behaviour, or when grafted onto pre-existing norms, 
44 A critical mass may be as high as all the NNWS and one of the permanent five members of the security 
council, all ofthe NNWS, the de-facto states and the non-compliant states, before it will be taken seriously by 
the NWS and cascade through the affected community. 
45 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," p. 895. 
46 Ibid, p. 888. 
47 J. O. March, J. P. Olsen, The logic of Appropriateness, Arena Centre for European Studies: Worldng Papers 
(WP 04/09), p. 5, retrieved November 19, 2009 from < http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp04_9.pdf>. 
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and second, that there are competing norms which challenge the successful emergence of new 
norms.48 
There are a number of factors which influence the potency of a new norm and its successful 
transmission by norm entrepreneurs to other states. Maria Rost Rublee suggests that a new 
norm is more likely to be assessed as appropriate if it is linked clearly to an already 
established value, ifit is considered to be most suitable to the context, and if the new norm is 
consistent with other commitments or values.49 She suggests that non-proliferation has been 
widely successful as it is linked with other strongly held values within the regime. Regime 
compliance is highly valued for benefits such as access to nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes, and conversely, due to potential social sanctions for violating this norm.50 In 
addition, the nuclear non-proliferation regime consists of "an interlocking network of 
multilateral and bilateral agreements, structures, and relationships, all supported by the 
NPT.,,51 Each ofthese formal and informal relationships, such as the International Atomic 
Energy Agency Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocol or the various export control 
regimes, supports the prevailing non-proliferation norm.52 
The influence of complementary norms 
The development of a strong case for nuclear disarmament is dependent on the capacity of 
norm entrepreneurs to frame the new norm such that it complements current practice in the 
international community. In this context, valid legal, ethical and strategic arguments playa 
central role, but on their own, are insufficient to persuade or convince NWS to adapt their 
nuclear policies. Rather, the strength of the case for nuclear disarmament hinges on the more 
pragmatic claim that "while nuclear weapons could not be disinvented, their possession, and 
use- and their eventual elimination- could nevertheless be managed by strong norms and 
institutions. ,,53Middle power advocates of nuclear disarmament must be back this claim by 
48 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," p. 895. 
49 M. R. Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to 
Understand Regime Effectiveness," p. 430. 
50 Ibid, p. 421. 
51 Ibid, p. 425. 
52 Fo; example, agreements from the Zangger Coalition and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) 
and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) reflect an emphasis on non-proliferation. 
53 M. Hanson, "The Advocacy States: Their Normative Role before and after the US Call for Nuclear 
Elimination," p. 59. This reflects the sentiment in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Blix 
Commission) report which stated that while the weapons cannot be "uninvented but can be outlawed and use 
can become unthinkable." The report also states that "compliance, verification and enforcement rules can, with 
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referring to precedent for such actions and creating new policies that complement this 
proposition (the creation of an 'enabling environment,).54 This involves framing both the 
problem and the policy solutions such that they appear to be consistent with the current 
behaviour. 
It follows then, that nuclear disarmament advocates will increase the salience of their case if 
they frame the norm as a part of a broader movement in the international community to 
disarm certain categories of weapons deemed inhumane or contrary to international 
humanitarian law. These states must clearly reference the legal and humanitarian case for 
nuclear disarmament which has developed out of the early rules governing the conduct of 
hostilities and laws of war, the 'just war' doctrine/5 and humanitarian law.56 Developments 
include the norm of civilian protection, the move to minimise collateral damage and avoid 
indiscriminate effects, particularly long-term environmental harm. It is of importance to 
middle power advocacy that precedence exists to ban the production, transfer and use of 
specific weapons categories including chemical and biological weapons, antipersonnel 
landmines, and cluster munitions. Such examples suggest that efforts to regulate, control and 
abolish certain weapons categories have become increasingly comprehensive in scope and 
obligation. While none of these examples provide a clear record of compliance, they 
represent a progression of disarmament treaties increasing in sophistication. Advocates of 
nuclear disarmament would benefit from drawing on these examples as they demonstrate the 
sort of realistic disarmament frameworks that can be developed. Advocates would be in a 
stronger position if they could clarify policy solutions that further diminish the sphere of 
unregulated activity. 
the requisite will, be effectively applied. And with that will, even the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is 
not beyond the world's reach." "Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
Arms," Report of the International Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, p.l6, retrieved July 21,2009 
from <http://www. wmdcommission.org/>. 
54 Director General S. Kongstad, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seminar: A Nordic Initiativefor 
Nuclear Abolition, p. 4. 
55 K. E. Kjellman, "Review: Norms, Persuasion and Practice: Landmine Monitor and Civil Society," Third 
World Quarterly, 24,5: The Future of Humanitarian Mine Action, (October 2003), p. 958. This doctrine dates 
back to the scholarship of Cicero (106 BCE-43 BCE); however, literature onjus ad bellum, the right to go to 
war and jus in bello, right conduct within war can be found in M. Walzer, Arguing about War, London: Yale 
University Press, (2004). 
56 Historical examples of prohibitions concerning specific weapons categories include the 1645 Strasbourg 
Agreement between France and Germany which was the first international agreement limiting the limiting the 
use of chemical weapons, in this case, poison bullets. Later, the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration prohibited the 
use of exploding bullets, the 1899 First Hague Conference banned' dum- dum' bullets and the 1925 Geneva Gas 
Protocol, 1949 Geneva Convention prevented the use of indiscriminate chemical weapons. 
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As Rublee notes, the non-proliferation norm has been reinforced by the many nuclear-related 
agreements that form the non-proliferation regime. A similar argument could be put forward 
for disarmament. Nuclear-related agreements currently place operational limits and prohibit 
nuclear arms deployment in certain geographical areas reflected in the wide application of 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ). The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 suggests that 
agreement is not only possible between rival states and superpowers, but nuclear weapons 
that can be subject of 'blanket bans. ,57 Other non-proliferation regime agreements undertaken 
at a unilateral, bilateral and multilateral level that limit (or prohibit) a states capacity to 
manufacture, test, supply, transfer or acquire nuclear arms or related technologies also lend 
support, explicitly or in principle, to the norm of nuclear disarmament. 58 These limitations 
culminate in an extremely high nuclear threshold (otherwise known as the nuclear taboo )/9 
recognised as a tradition or norm of non-use (or 'no first use'). Policies that compliment non-
proliferation regime restrictions already in place should be more likely to be adopted and 
considered as feasible. 
In addition, the successful conclusion of nuclear disarmament in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Libya, 
South Africa and Ukraine, and nuclear reversals in such as Brazil and Argentina present a 
clear precedent for larger scale nuclear disarmament efforts. Policy solutions derived from 
these examples could draw on the reasons why these states choose to invest in security 
without nuclear weapons, the dynamic of the disarmament efforts, the states involved, and the 
sort of verification and compliance mechanisms that were successful. 
The influence of competing norms 
The identification of competing norms is crucial to this discussion as the emerging norm of 
nuclear disarmament is at odds with dominant non-proliferation regime norms such as 
nuclear deterrence and counter-proliferation. These opposing perspectives, or rationales, 
challenge the logic and reason behind nuclear disarmament; however, understanding this 
competition is critical to more accurately and realistically assess the most appropriate course 
of action and advocacy. In order for successful norm emergence to occur these opposing 
57 C. Ungerer, "Influence Without Power: Middle Powers and Arms Control During the Cold War," Diplomacy 
& Statecraft, 18,2, (June 2007), p. 401. 
58 Examples ofthe non-proliferation agreements include the Partial Test ban Treaty, Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone treaties, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenar Agreement 
and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2008). 
59 N. Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins ofthe Nuclear Taboo," p. 34 and T. V. Paul, "Taboo or 
tradition? The non-use of nuclear weapons in world politics," p. 853. 
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arguments must be addressed, and firmly rebutted, and logics complementary to disarmament 
must be emphasised. 60 Advocates must prove that contradictory or competitive norms such as 
nuclear deterrence are counterproductive and anachronistic to contemporary security threats 
and show that arms control alone is theoretically, practically and strategically insufficient to 
meet comprehensive security needs. 61 The movement to enable disarmament (which refers to 
the process of gradual reductions to a point of abolition), can be distinguished from the more 
limited objectives of 'arms control'; nonetheless it should be emphasised that arms control 
lends support to the position that that certain weapons can face restrictions on deployment 
levels and on the scope of potential use. 62 Advocates must also prove that disarmament is 
neither an absolute nor relative weakening of a states strategic, security or political position. 
Moreover, the proactive development of disarmament policies is necessary because the 
maintenance of the status quo in fact contributes to a relative decrease in security. Just as the 
strength of the non-proliferation regime is derived from the widespread (near universal) 
support for the regime norms that govern member-state behaviour, conflicting interpretations 
of regime objectives and different rules of behaviour that apply to NWS and NNWS create 
uncertainty within this regime environment, further reducing the strength of the three pillars. 
Such uncertainty is also likely to complicate norm emergence, just as the existence of 
conflicting norms will reduce the likelihood of a new norms transmission from one state to 
the next.63 
In addition to framing the new norm as a logical product of its environment, entrepreneurs are 
required to take a proactive stance on policy formation in order to persuade states to align 
with the new norm. Passive support by middle powers will not be sufficient. Advocates take 
the characteristics of the issue into account when constructing an argument that references the 
complementary and competitive aspects of the normative environment. Entrepreneurs must 
address the political and strategic utility of weapon in question by developing new policies 
and agreements that can assume the functions previously played by the weapon. When 
60 Utilising complementary logic includes emphasising the role of disarmament and leveraging it within the 
promotion of other regime norms (non-proliferation as the pre-eminent norm in the regime particularly through 
United Nations Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) and even later, 1540 (2004). Additionally conditions 
need to be placed on other actors and agreements such that they ultimately support disarmament. 
61 C. Bluth, "Norms and International Relations: The anachronistic nature ofneo-realist approaches," POLIS 
Working Paper No. 12, University of Leeds, (February 2004), p.32, retrieved December 15,2009 from 
<http://www.polis.1eeds.ac. ukiassets/files/research/working -papers/wp 12bluth. pdf> . 
62 W. Clarke, "Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and 
Failure," p. 6. 
63 M. R. Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to 
Understand Regime Effectiveness," p. 430. 
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framing the policy debate entrepreneurs must take into account and clearly identify the causal 
story, the parties involved and those responsible or liable.64 They must also clearly identify 
where the problem lies (be it demand or supply-side, the causes of insecurity, whether it is a 
regulation or enforcement issue). The entrepreneur's capacity to be clear and concise in their 
treatment of the challenges and potential policy solutions will make the norm more plausible 
and attractive. 65 This clarity over the issues, policy solutions and rebuttal of competing logics 
must be integrated into the principled advocacy of disarmament. 
Successful norm emergence 
Successful norm emergence is characterised in Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle as 
intemalisation of the standard of behaviour, which is accepted as appropriate and no longer 
the subject of widely contested debate. While Finnemore and Sildcink contend that states 
could bandwagon with the dominant actors, the core assumption of intemalisation suggests 
that compliance only occurs with 'wholehearted acceptance.' In Taking Stock of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Regime Maria Rost Rublee identifies the additional motivating factors that 
lead states to comply with (nuclear non proliferation regime) norms, in a way that broadens 
this understanding and reflects a more politically realistic and nuanced approach. 66 Rublee's 
analysis of state compliance, in the case of the norm of nuclear restraint, is based on three 
subsets of responses to the nuclear non proliferation regime. 67 She suggests that 'nuclear 
forbearance' (or compliance with non-proliferation norms) is motivated by three factors: 
persuasion, social conformity, and identification. She argues that persuasion, or the 
intemalisation of the norm, is not the only reason for state compliance.68 Rublee states that 
conformity or the reference to social prestige and/ or the avoidance of social costs, and 
identification with important state promoters of the norm can be equally effective in 
motivating state engagement. 69 
As the motivations for state compliance are more complex than the behavioural outcome 
, 
(compliance) would suggest, middle powers could craft more persuasive and pragmatic 
disarmament policy solutions by taking into account the various motivations of states, 
64 W. Clarke, "Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and 
Failure," p. 8. 
65 Ibid, p. 11. 
66 M. R. Rub1ee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to 
Understand Regime Effectiveness," p. 420. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid, p. 422. 
69 Ibid, p. 421. 
19 
including the impact of social and strategic influences (such as the prestige value of nuclear 
weapons), and the domestic and international decision-making environment (including NPT 
and CD politics). This also reinforces the point that a principled, logic based approach will 
not be as effective as a strategy that appeals to this broader range of motivating factors. 
Middle powers as norm entrepreneurs 
This thesis holds that there is a core group of middle power states that are well suited to a role 
as disarmament advocates. These states occupy a structural position (in the middle ofthe 
international hierarchy) which limits the foreign policy options available to them. These 
states are vulnerable to great power politics and the power imbalances in bilateral, regional 
and multilateral relationships, and as such, these states are not able to force their positions on 
others. This asymmetry forms the core motivation for these states to actively seek and 
support the development of international norms that can constrain the great powers and 
ensure a more constructive and equitable international environment. 70 As a concept, the 
'middle power' state has historically been difficult to define. As a category it has been subject 
to arbitrary distinctions and semantic variation, resulting in the terms over-use and misuse;71 
however, this term retains conceptual value as a behavioural definition.72 In the absence of 
useful objective measurement criteria, the agency ofthese states becomes the most important 
variable.73 Conclusions from previous research, which have often over-estimated the merit 
attributable to these states, are relevant in this context when bought together to define an 
ambitious foreign policy standard. This standard of best practice can be used to assess the 
diplomacy of a self-selecting group of prospective middle power states who aspire or appeal 
to the values of a 'middle power' in their foreign policies. 74 
Previous research on middle power states suggests that they are most effective when 
exhibiting activist, internationalist, niche and coalition based diplomacy; however, these 
tactics are not demonstrated consistently, as these states exert influence only where they 
70 H. A. Smith, "Unwilling Internationalism or Strategic internationalism? Canadian Climate Policy Under the 
Conservative Government," Canadian Foreign Policy, 15,2, (Summer 2009), p. 59. 
71 Semantics ofthe word middle as medium, mode, mean, or middle in terms of geography or ideology, or based 
on any other objective measurement- becomes such a loosely defined and amorphous collection of states that 
term looses all meaning. C. Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics and J. M. Welsh, "Canada in the 
21 st Century: Beyond Domination and Middle Power," The Round Table, 93, 376, (2004), p. 586. 
72 A. Chapnick, 'The Middle Power,' Canadian Foreign Policy, 7, 2, (Winter 1999), p. 73. 
73 M.A. Rudderham, "Middle Power Pull: Can Middle Powers use Public Diplomacy to Ameliorate the Image of 
the West?" p. 16. 
74 This definition acts as a population control and helps to define the limits when the findings are generalised. K. 
M. Eisenhardt, "Building Theories from Case Study Research," p. 537. 
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can.
75 In many cases these states are supporters or followers where the international climate 
or resource constraints prohibit anything more proactive.76 Middle power influence is 
persuasive, but rarely a deciding force,77 and as such, these states tend to rely upon 
cooperative rather than competitive strategies. 78 The limited resources available to these 
states also prompt them to invest in niche areas,79 as it is through specialisation that these 
states can leverage their intellectual capital to their competitive advantage. 8o Their leadership 
styles include the development of specialised expertise which has often been characterised as 
technical or entrepreneurial leadership. These states direct policy development by acting as a 
'facilitators', 'managers,' 'synergists' or 'catalysts. ,81 The activist and internationalist 
element in particular, are best illustrated by the principles of' good international citizenship' 
(GIC). Gareth Evans'has suggested that suggests that GIC objectives, such as principled 
foreign policy, commitment to international institutions, support for international instruments, 
are as important as to the promotion of national interests as political, strategic and economic 
obj ectives. 82 
Norm promotion is a logical extension of 'ideal' middle power foreigti policy preferences. 
This is an area where middle powers are likely to pursue active leadership roles, because this 
will increase their international standing and could contribute to an environment that is more 
75 A. K. Henrikson, "Niche Diplomacy in the world Public Arena: the Global 'Corners' of Canada and Norway," 
in J, Melissen (ed.) The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Studies in Diplomacy 
and International Relations), Palgrave Macmillan, First Edition, (2005), p. 67. 
76 E. Jordaan, "The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging 
and Traditional Middle Powers," Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, 30, 2, (November 2003), 
p.165. 
77 A. K. Henrikson, "Niche Diplomacy in the world Public Arena: the Global 'Corners' of Canada and Norway," 
p.66. 
78 Oran Young in M. Hanson, "Regulating the possession and use of nuclear weapons: Ideas, commissions, and 
agency in international security politics- the case ofthe Canberra Commission" in Thakur R., Cooper A. F. and 
English J., (eds.) International Commissions and the Power of Ideas, United Nations University Press (June 5, 
2005), p. 129. 
79 A. F. Cooper, "Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview," in Niche diplomacy: middle powers after the 
Cold War, Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire, (November 1997), p. 4. 
80 A. K. Henrikson, "Niche Diplomacy in the world Public Arena: the Global 'Corners' of Canada and Norway," 
p.7l. 
81 L. Baxter and J. A. Bishop "Uncharted Ground: Canada, Middle Power Leadership, and Public Diplomacy," 
Journal of Public and International Affairs, 9, (Spring 1998), p. 84., A. Hurrell, "Some Reflections on the role 
of Intermediate Powers in International Institutions," in Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of 
Intermediate States, Number 244, Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 
(March 2000), p. 1., L. Neak, "Empirical Observations on Middle State Behvaiour at the Start of a New 
International System," Pacific Focus, 7 (1992), p. 5., and R. A. Matthew, 'Middle power and NGO 
partnerships: The Expansion of World Politics,' in K. R. Rutherford, S. Brem, and R. A. Matthew, Reframing 
the Agenda: the Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security Policy, London, 
Praeger, (2003), p. 11. 
82 G. Evans and B. Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations In the World of the 1990s, p. 56. 
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conducive to international cooperation. 83 Marianne Hanson explains this further suggesting 
that rather than merely complying with existing rules and norms, it is in the states' best 
interest to pursue "innovative and active diplomatic ventures to progress those norms and 
rules.,,84 There is a natural progression from "a responsible and activist state (to)[sic] 
formulating proposals to set the direction for international policies.,,85 
Organisational platforms 
As per norms theory, organisational platforms provide an additional opportunity for middle 
powers to leverage their limited resources. As middle powers cannot act alone effectively, 86 
however, they may, as Robert Keohane explains, "be able to have a systematic impact in a 
small group through an international institution. ,,87 It is by forming formal or informal (ad 
hoc) coalitions that middle power states can best exploit the existing 'institutional platforms' 
as these 'provide political space' and a unique 'voice opportunity' that may not happen in the 
'broader marketplace of ideas. ,88 The term 'coalition' in this context is defined quite broadly 
to refer to organised, issue focused multilateral groupings. These covers a spectrum of state 
sponsored activity associated with norm promotion. The coalition approach is identifiable as 
these are comprised of like-minded states, most often other middle powers. Middle power 
coalitions can be complemented by partnerships with transnational advocacy networks and as 
Chapter Three will investigate these coalitions could benefit from the advocacy strategies 
employed by international commissions.89 It must be noted that in the cases where middle 
powers invest in international commissions or cooperate with transnational advocacy 
networks, norm advocacy is removed from the purview of the state, challenging the strict 
definition of the middle power coalition advocacy. Casting this 'net' broadly (and rather 
loosely) reveals a more nuanced understanding conditions under which middle power 
advocacy is effective (and where it exceeds the theories legitimate application). 
83 H. A. Smith, "Unwilling Internationalism or Strategic internationalism? Canadian Climate Policy Under the 
Conservative Government," p. 59. 
84 Ibid, p. 59. 
85 Ibid, p. 59. 
86 A. F. Cooper, ''Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War," p. 8. 
87 H. White, "The Defence White Paper and Australia's Future in Asia: Will We Remain a Middle Power?" 
ANU Podcast Public Lecture, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, (May 21,2009), retrieved July 20,2009 
from < http://www.anu.edu.au/discoveranul content/podcastsl defence_white ..-raper!>. 
88 A. F. Cooper, ''Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War," p. 8. 
89 M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Cornell 
University Press (1998), p. 35. 
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Coalition building is seen as an obvious route to greater middle power influence, and 
complements the tendency towards cooperative diplomacy. These state-based coalitions have 
emerged as a way to counterbalance interests or deflect the preferences and polices of the 
most powerful. 90 These coalitions can form vital functions such as renewing focus and 
momentum on specific middle power issues of concern. These groupings also act as the 
catalyst for diplomatic efforts, primarily as a microclimate for information gathering and 
policy preparation. Their activities also include the organisation of meetings, bringing groups 
of experts together to push the agenda forward. 91 These groupings allows these middle power 
states to achieve multiple foreign policy objectives, as each state brings a unique set of skills, 
attributes, reputational qualifications and connections to the group and are effective because 
the'states can leverage their geographic diversity (crossing regional and hemispheric divides). 
It is the external alignment of each state that allows the coalition to involve key actors. 92 The 
economical investment of limited resources in niche areas makes middle powers receptive to 
working with others to achieve shared goals as they can maximise the utility of their 
specialisation. The collaboration of a range of actors within these coalitions confers 
legitimacy on the processes,93 a value that is reinforced by the internationalist orientation, 
previous experience, and independent foreign policies of the member states.94 The value of 
the multilateral coalition also stems from the international standing of the members and the 
quality of the output in terms of policy. 
With comparatively small, highly specialised foreign ministries, middle powers tend to build 
close relationships with non- governmental organisations (NGO) to complement and expand 
their knowledge, skills base and contacts.95 This close working relationship with NGOs is 
conducive to the development of transnational advocacy and research networks. 96 As such, 
these coalitions are "well positioned to engage in cooperative public diplomacy by virtue of 
their substantial soft power and established networks.',97 The use of soft power in this area 
90 A. Hurrell, "Some Reflections on the role ofIntermediate Powers in International Institutions," p. 3. 
91 A. Hurrell, "Some Reflections on the role ofIntermediate Powers in International Institutions," p. 3. 
92 Ibid, p. 4. 
93 B. Hocking, "Rethinking the 'New' Public Diplomacy," in J. Melissen (ed.) The New Public Diplomacy: Soft 
Power in International Relations (Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations), Pa1grave Macmillan, First 
Edition (2005), p. 38. 
94 M. Hanson, "Regulating the possession and use of nuclear weapons: Ideas, commissions, and agency in 
international security politics- the case ofthe Canberra Commission," p. 128. 
95 A. F. Cooper, ''Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview," p. 11. 
96 M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, p. 61 
97 M.A. Rudderham, "Middle Power Pull: Can Middle Powers use Public Diplomacy to Ameliorate the Image of 
the West?" p. 19. 
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reinforces the credibility of the middle powers and thus the influence of their position. 98 Soft 
power is effective as states can persuasively frame issues, such that they are conducive to 
prevailing norms. Their multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy draws on a tradition of 
similar engagement in human security, peacemaking, economic reform and trade 
negotiations. 99 This effort is reinforced by the spill-over benefits in other areas of foreign 
affairs and trade, and as a welcome by-product, also increases the international profile of the 
state or group of states involved. 100 
Advocacy platforms in the non-proliferation regime 
The coalition approach is particularly useful in the context of the non-proliferation regime, 
which presents a unique set of challenges for middle power advocates of new policy 
positions. This regime provides few opportunities for middle powers states to exert influence 
as the institutions are in part negotiated, but also in part imposed upon these states. 101 
Potential for middle power influence in nuclear negotiations is further complicated by the fact 
that decision-making and negotiation occurs at two levels, both domestic and international, 
and deep ideological and political divisions are entrenched by the formal groupings of states, 
the NonAligned Movement (NAM), the Western Group and Others, and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), as the most influential voting blocks. Unlike their more formal 
counterparts such as the NAM, these middle power coalitions can be more flexible and 
versatile both in the structure of the coalition and in their approach to the issues. These 
groupings are better equipped to remove or neutralise obstacles that have previously hindered 
progress, particularly the radical states, as these new groups can counterbalance, mediate or 
bridge the contentious positions. 102 They can also renew focus and keep the process of 
negotiations on track. These coalitions are particularly useful to promote specific goals 
98 J. S. Nye in J Melissen, "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice," p. 4. 
99 For more information see C. Pratt, Humane Internationalism, and A. F. Cooper, "The evolution of 
Multilateralism in an Intermediate State: The Reorientation of Canadian Strategy in the Economic and Security 
Arenas," in A. Hurrell, A. F. Cooper, G. G. Gonzalez, R. U. Sennes and S. Sitaraman, Paths to Power: Foreign 
Policy Strategies of Intermediate States Working Paper Number 244, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
School, (March 2000). 
100 A. F. Cooper, ''Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview," p. 4. . 
101 K. Colijn, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: a medium-power concern?" International Journal, 59,2, (2004) 
p. 350. The only exceptions are agreement that offer rotating membership or chairmanship positions. These 
include the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the United Nations Security Council. 
102 O. Meier, "News Analysis: Bioweapons Treaty Progress Predicted," Arms Control Today, (November 2006) 
retrieved May 14, 2009 from <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_11INABio>. 
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without threatening the central alliances or the major foreign policy orientations of target 
states. 103 
Coalition Strategies 
Within this 'coalition approach' there is scope for a wide range of advocacy strategies. These 
strategies are dependent on the context in which the advocacy will take place. It is important 
that these coalitions are flexible enough to tailor their diplomacy to suit situation. Unlike 
larger states, which have large, inflexible bureaucracies, with fixed, reallocated budgets, 
middle powers can move quickly to capture a moment or capitalise on a situation that may 
arise. Middle power have demonstrated strategies that include an incremental approach, 
consensus oriented activity, maximalist approach (goal orientated), or in some cases, fast 
track diplomacy. These strategies will be investigated in more detail in the following 
chapters. 
Methodology: the theoretical template 
The preceding discussion has established a theoretical foundation and developed the 
conceptual definitions that will guide the research in this thesis. It has focused on the 
implications ofthe norm life cycle as the mechanism by which new norms may emerge; 
however, given the breadth of discussion it is both useful and practical to draw together the 
outcomes of this discussion and create a template of variables that will be used to assess and 
verify the hypothesis. There are four moderator variables that determine the strength of the 
relationship between the dependent variable (the effective middle power diplomacy) and 
independent variable (the coalition approach). 
The influence of the moderator variables are determined by a series of conditions which 
include: (1) the capacity of the norm entrepreneurs to demonstrate leadership, to tailor the 
diplomatic engagement to suit the purpose of advocacy, and to engage with non-
governmental organisations. (2) The characteristics of the issue also determine the successful 
promotion of the emerging norm, including the utility of the weapon, the clarity of the causal 
story demonstrating clear responsibility, and clarity over the problem. (3) Theframing of the 
issue plays a critical role in persuasive norm building. Effective framing will be conditional 
upon the connection of the new norm to clear standard of appropriateness, the visibility of the 
103 C. Pratt, Humane Internationalism, p. 84. The primary alliances of the middle power states will still be with 
the main powers or voting blocs (i.e. the ED or NATO). 
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issue on the international agenda, and the clarity of the solution. l04 (4) Acting upon all of 
these issues are the constraints of the international environment. The impact ofthe normative 
environment depends on whether complementary norms exist (which increases the likelihood 
that the new norm will be accepted), competing norms exist (which reduces the likelihood 
that the norm will be transmitted), or the environment is one of uncertainty (which 
complicates the advocacy). 105 
These variables have been developed through an iterative process that compared the theory to 
the empirical evidence, with the hope of finding a balance between proscription and 
reality. 106 The moderator variables represent the most important conditions that influence 
middle power advocacy. The application of the template enables a controlled comparison of 
individual case studies across previously separate field of study. The controlled comparisons 
avoids the development of overly complex and unwieldy outcomes based on the empirical 
evidence, while the broad scope of cases chosen is more likely to lead to conclusions that are 
robust and nuanced rather than narrow and idiosyncratic. lO? Such analysis will allow the 
investigation of implications beyond the immediate cases presented. 108 The empirical 
evidence has been based on a series of interviews with diplomats, academics and policy 
makers in Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Norway in addition to primary and secondary 
sources. Qualitative analysis is best suited to this type of exploratory research and theoretical 
development. l09 The case studies that have been chosen help to capture the nuances of state 
self-perception, the states' foreign policy preferences, and the normative impact of middle 
power entrepreneurs in a way that quantitative analysis would overlook. 
104 Warren Clarke, "Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success and 
Failure," p. 6. 
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Chapter Three: Middle powers as nuclear disarmament norm entrepreneurs 
"Progress in building the non-proliferation regime has historically depended on the 
agreement of the nuclear weapon states. But progress does not necessarily begin with 
these states.,,110 
Middle powers, independently and in partnership with other 'like-minded' states, have 
influenced the course of the nuclear non-proliferation regime through their advocacy of a 
balanced approach to the implementation of the three pillars of the NPT. These states have 
exercised leadership by catalysing and consolidating progress at critical points in the 
development of the regime. Notable contributions by individual middle powers include 
General Assembly Resolution 1576 (XV) of 1960, proposed by Ireland and jointly submitted 
with Canada, Japan, Mexico and Morocco. This resolution preceded the negotiation of the 
NPT by calling upon "both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, pending agreement on 
the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, to refrain, as a temporary and 
voluntary measure, from acts that would lead to further proliferation." 111 Additionally, 
Canada and South Africa played key roles in the extension and strengthening of the NPT at 
the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and Australia was instrumental in securing the 
successful negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. It is through 
these contributions that middle power states have developed a reputation as advocates of 
nuclear disarmament; however, it is in coalition with other like-minded states that the 
diplomacy of these middle powers has proved to be most conducive to nuclear disarmament 
norm promotion. 
Nuclear disarmament coalitions have enabled middle power states to develop policy, drive 
debate and engage other states that would otherwise be reluctant to consider potentially 
intrusive constraints on their sovereignty. This chapter considers the New Agenda Coalition 
(NAC) as a prime example of this middle power state-led coalition diplomacy. This coalition 
approach proved to be valuable asset between 1998 and 2000 in the movement to secure a 
consensus outcome at the 2000 RevCon; however, this outcome failed to gain traction beyond 
the conference itself. This chapter will investigate the advocacy strategy adopted by the NAC 
110 D. MacFhionnbhairr, P. Lewis, M. Laker and 1. F. Machado, "Constructing a New Agenda," in J. Cirincione 
(ed.), Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Routledge: New York, 
(2000), p. 267. 
III United Nations General Assembly, 15th Session, Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear 
Weapons, UNGA Resolution 1576 (XV), (December 20, 1960), retrieved November 20,2009 from 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/15/aresI5.htm> . 
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with reference to the moderator variables outlined in the previous chapter. The following 
analysis will identify the conditions that influenced success of the NAC, as well as potential 
areas where the NAC states could improve their disarmament advocacy. 
The New Agenda Coalition 
From the outset, the NAC distinguished itself from the dominant bloc rivalry between the 
NWS and the NAM by establishing a position on nuclear disarmament that sought to balance 
NPT non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. Within the static regime environment 
dominated by voting blocs, the NAC championed an alternative and ultimately more 
inclusive policy position "to shake off the rigidity of the old agenda. ,,112 The NAC member 
states Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden outlined the 
coalition's objectives in a Joint Ministerial Declaration issued on June 9, 1998 in Dublin, 
Ireland. 113 The NAC position on disarmament was notable for three reasons: (1) the balanced 
approach to nuclear disarmament, (2) the emphasis on the importance ofNNWS efforts in 
cooperation with NWS, and (3) the importance of pursuing multiple, parallel efforts to 
advance the disarmament agenda across the board. This statement proposed a multi-stranded 
approach of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral actions, including reducing the high levels 
ofNWS operational readiness, the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) by Annex II states, the negotiation of the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in 
the CD and the development of requisite verification regimes by the international community. 
This statement outlined a more comprehensive direction for nuclear disarmament than has 
previously been articulated by a group of states at this level and formed the foundation for 
future NAC advocacy efforts in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the NPT RevCon and 
numerous other forums. 
New Agenda Coalition advocacy in the lead up to the 2000 Review Conference 
The NAC took advantage of the opportunities provided by multilateral forums such as the 
UNGA, generating momentum by engaging the international community in high profile 
debate. The NAC framed this debate by sponsoring UNGA and First Committee resolutions 
including the UN Resolution 53177Y of December 4, 1998 which was adopted by 114 states, 
112 D. MacFhionnbhairr, P. Lewis, M. Laker and L. F. Machado, "Constructing a New Agenda," p. 271. 
113 A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need/or a New Agenda, Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, (June 9, 1998) 
retrieved August 30, 2008 from <http://documents-
ddsny. un.org/docIUNDOC/GEN/N98/164/44/pdf/N9816444.pdf>. 
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with 18 opposed and 38 abstentions. The second NAC resolution, Towards a Nuclear-
Weapon-Free World: the Needfor a New Agenda submitted in 1999 was adopted by a similar 
number of states with 111 votes in support, 13 opposed and 39 abstentions. I 14 These early 
NAC efforts were effective in raising the profile of the NAC proposals and captured the 
attention of the international community. These resolutions also provided a mechanism by 
which the NAC could publically aggregate international support. Voting patterns reveal that a 
number of NATO states abstained from voting (rather than opposing) the resolutions. This 
was notable as it suggested that there was more movement in the policy positions of the 
NATO states than previously expected from this voting bloc. It is difficult to determine the 
extent of influence of the NAC advocacy efforts; however, this high profile debate put the 
NWS into a position where they had to defend the adequacy of the disarmament measures 
untaken to date and the seriousness of their commitment to the NPT obligations. 115 It soon 
became clear that the NWS were also "far more concerned about the NAC resolution than 
about the more hard-line recurring resolutions from Myanmar and Malaysia, which called for 
'timebound nuclear disarmament and negotiations leading to a nuclear weapon 
convention. ,,,116 The NAC supported the UNGA resolutions by presenting a statement to the 
1999 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) on 12 May and a working paper cosponsored 
by 44 states, making use of this multilateral forum to reinforce the UNGA resolutions and the 
NAC position. I 17 
The NAC used the resolutions as an attempt to review implementation, (unfortunately this 
review element did not feature as prominently in later NAC efforts). The NAC went some 
way to developing a comprehensive policy solution, touching upon the implementation aspect 
of a forward looking disarmament strategy in UN Resolution 53177Y of December 4, 1998. 
This resolution articulated a request to report on the implementation of the resolution (to be 
compiled by the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG)), the NAC intention to table a 
follow-up resolution, and review implementation at the fifty-fourth session of the UNGA in 
114 Sponsored and co-sponsored by the governments of Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, 
Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Ireland, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Samoa, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia. For the full text see R. Johnson, "UNGA First 
Committee Report," Disarmament Diplomacy, 41, (November 1999), retrieved December 9,2008 from < 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd41/index.htm> . 
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1999. While the steps in the 2000 RevCon action plan referred to a number of concrete and 
actionable points as well as the more general commitments, 118 the 13 Step action plan was not 
articulated within a framework or structure that could provide ongoing support, and so the 
steps became outdated very quickly. 
New Agenda Coalition advocacy at the 2000 Review Conference 
Having established the 'new agenda' as key feature of the political landscape, the NAC states 
used the coalition as a platform to exercise leadership at the 2000 RevCon, concluding a 
constructive backwards looking document and a forward-looking action plan in negotiations 
moderated by Norway. 119 Proposals were exchanged between the NAC and the NWS until a 
consensus was met on both documents. The success of the conference has been widely 
attributed to the NAC states' skilled conference diplomacy, as these states acted as a bridge 
between the NWS and NAM. The NAC countries were able to exert influence on these voting 
blocs as they had access to all of the main UN caucus groups (such as the NAM, NWFZ 
areas, NATO and the European Union (EU)) by virtue of the diverse membership ofthe 
coalition. This direct engagement enabled the NAC states to advocate for the 'new agenda' 
directly to the broadest possible audience, unite the middle ground, and reach agreement on 
the language they had negotiated. 120 The consensus outcome was also concluded because of 
the momentum maintained by the NAC countries in the lead up to the RevCon which 
overcame the roadblocks, particularly over the languageofIraq's non-compliance. 
Additionally, the NAC "were unprepared to see negative signals emerge" and "sought to 
concentrate on the areas where agreement was possible.,,121 
The success of this coalition as a negotiating nexus can be attributed to the NAC member 
states' history of nuclear disarmament advocacy. The international standing of these states, 
reinforced by the coalition, contributed to the initial appeal the NAC position. ill the lead-up 
to the formation of the NAC, these states made notable contributions to the nuclear 
disarmament movement within the non-proliferation regime including submissions to the IC] 
Advisory Opinion hearings. 122 Prior to this, Brazil had established a reputation for having 
118 R. Johnson, "Divisions and Doubts At the Third NPT PrepCom." 
119 J. Simpson, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
Yearbook 2001, Stockholm, (2001), p. 485. 
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rolled back a nuclear program, signing the Brazilian-Argentine Agreement on the Peaceful 
Use of Nuclear Energy in 1980, ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994. As a key Arab and 
NAM state, Egypt was notable as a supporter of the weapons of mass destruction free zone 
(WMDFZ) in the Middle East. Ireland as previously mentioned, was involved in the early 
development of the NPT and has remained a vocal advocate for disarmament as both a 
NATO and EU member. Mexico, representing Central America, is a supporter of the 
Southern Hemisphere Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (along with New Zealand). 123 New 
Zealand has established a reputation as a leading South Pacific nation, becoming nuclear free 
in 1987.124 New Zealand also took the French Nuclear Tests case to the IC] with Australia in 
1995. 125 Slovenia withdrew from the coalition in 1999 due to NATO co:rrlrllitments. 126 South 
Africa disarmed its nuclear program between 1989 and 1993, (Sweden has also renounced a 
nuclear program in 1968). Consequently, Sweden has supported debate on the nuclear issue 
including sponsoring the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security. 127 The 
breadth of geographical and political representation provided the NAC with early legitimacy, 
which was an advantage as the NAC was able to generated significant interest and 
momentum around the policy position within a relatively brief timeframe. 128 
The influence of a supportive international environment 
The influence of the NAC was ultimately dependent upon a supportive international 
environment. As such, the contribution of the NAC must be understood within the period of 
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International Court of Justice, Lit Verlag: Berlin (1998). 
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of the Court's Judgment of December 20, 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Order of 
September 22, 1995, General List No. 97 (1995). This case referred to the earlier Nuclear Tests Case (Australia 
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disarmament and threat reduction activity that followed the end ofthe Cold War. 129 
Movement on nuclear disarmament was made possible by the decrease in great power 
confrontation, which spurred the introduction of new treaties limiting the deployment of 
nuclear arms (including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 1991 and the 
CTBT which opened for signature in 1996), nuclear roll-back in South Africa and 
disarmament in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ulaaine. 130 The decade that followed the end of the 
Cold War is also notable for negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 
which was signed in 1993 and entered into force in 1997. As such this decade is often 
referred to as a 'disarmament decade'; however, this disarmament momentum was one of two 
trends that developed. The second, rising proliferation concerns (in particular with Iraq and 
North Korea) prompted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to reform its safeguards 
system, adopting the Model Additional Protocol on May 15, 1997. 131 This provided positive 
precedent for additional reform within the non-proliferation regime. In addition, the weapons 
tests by two non-NPT states, India, Pakistan, served as an impetus to shore up this regime and 
conclude a constructive RevCon outcome. 132 This coalition was able to take advantage of the 
heightened tensions created by proliferation concerns and the increased expectations for 
further progress on disarmament, transforming this political will into a the concrete, albeit 
limited, forward-looking consensus agreement. 
The demise of the bi-polar system created space for actors such as the NAC to more actively 
pursue nuclear-based foreign policies and claim a greater voice within the regime. The NAC 
states were successful in taking advantage of this opportunity as they crafted policies that had 
a broad appeal to the international community. This appeal can be attributed to the NAC 
states capacity to accurately frame the policy problem and solutions consistent with existing 
norms and present the solutions as a logical outcome of current developments. The NAC 
actively sought to frame their disarmament policy within complementary logics of 
129 Part 1, "Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policy Makers," Report of the 
International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, retrieved October 16, 2010 from 
<http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/part-i.html>. 
130 See T. Ogilvie-White, "Negotiating Nuclear Rollback in North Korea: Lessons from Ukraine and Libya", 
(forthcoming). See also Nuclear Threat Initiative, South Africa: Nuclear Overview, (January 2010) retrieved 
January 23,2010 from <http://www.nti.org/eJesearch/profiles/SAfrica/Nuclear/index.html> and L. S Wittner, 
Towards Nuclear Abolition: A Histo/y of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, Stanford University 
Press; 1 st edition (August 2003), p. 443. 
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Arms Control, Disarmament, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (2000), p. 488. 
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appropriateness, creating parallels between this position and that of chemical and biological 
weapons, referring to the Conventions of 1972 and 1993. The NAC states also emphasised 
supporting arguments drawn from the Canberra Commission and the International Court of 
Justice Advisory Opinion. 133 These states clearly identified the problem caused by Pakistan 
and India and used this as a reason for the "renewed urgency in the debate. ,,134 The NAC was 
also pragmatic in acknowledging the long term challenge of building a verification regime as 
such, the balanced package of policies offered had a broad appeal to the NWS and the 
increasingly vocal NAM. 
The 2005 Review Conference and the influence of a hostile international environment 
The conclusion of a consensus outcome document at the 2000 RevCon is a remarkable 
achievement given the conflicting nuclear norms, "generally unfavourable disarmament and 
international security context" 135 and the volatile nature of the non-proliferation regime 
politics. Given that this consensus collapsed shortly after the conference ended, the 
significance of long term middle power influence on this debate is bought into doubt. The 
divisive reinterpretation of the 2000 RevCon outcome resulted in little, if any, progress on the 
13 Steps between 2000 and the 2005 Rev Con. The NWS rolled-back or avoided their 
political commitments, while political will to implement this agreement was absent across the 
board. This marked "the onset of the 'great frustration' in arms control efforts.,,136 The 
international community responded to security challenges (such as North Korean non-
compliance and withdrawal from the treaty, the discovery ofthe A. Q. Khan Black market 
network 137 and the abuse of proliferation controls and verification mechanisms by Iran) by 
focusing on non-proliferation and counter proliferation to the detriment of progress on 
disarmament. 138 
133 International Court of Justice (Advisory Opinion), Legality of the Threat or Use of the Threat of Nuclear 
Weapons. 
134 A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Needfor a New Agenda, Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign 
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of International Affairs, 53, 1, (Apri11999), p. 2. 
137 K. Dewes, R. Powles, and A. Ware, "Snaring the Sun: Opportunities to prevent nuclear weapons 
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The international response was led by the neo-conservative Bush Administration which 
favoured plurilateral initiatives over multilateralism and international law. Actions such as 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the multinational force (MNF -I) that invaded 
Iraq to address concerns regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) directly 
challenged the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) mandate, in turn 
undermining the international community's confidence in multilateralism and the NPT. The 
United States nuclear weapons policy outlined in the 2002 United States National Security 
Strategy reaffirmed United States reliance on nuclear deterrence and offense nuclear 
capabilities. 139 This neo-conservative policy direction ran counter the 13 Step objectives and 
was heavily criticised by the NAM, further deepening the divide between NWS and the 
NNWS. 140 While the 2005 RevCon failure cannot be solely attributed to the inaction of the 
NAC given the overwhelming pressure from forces outside the RevCon environment, in a 
striking comparison to the 2000 Review, NAC leadership was absent. It appears that the 
'NAC-NWS negotiating nexus' was unique to 2000. The NAC was not able to demonstrate 
consistent support for the outcome between 2000 and 2005 or advance the 'new agenda' 
further. 
Internal divisions and the collapse of the New Agenda Coalition 
In the face of internal divisions the NAC began to fall apart "soon after it brought about the 
ground breaking disarmament plan of action." 141 The NAC had been under pressure from the 
very beginning as demonstrated by Slovenia's withdrawal from the coalition. 142 The 
breakdown of the NAC became apparent at the NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) 
meetings in the three years prior to 2005. Despite annual NAC resolutions to the UN First 
Committee on Disarmament and International Security and position papers at the Prep Com 
meetings the NAC could do little to raise the profile of the 13 Steps or follow up on their 
implementation. 143 By 2005 the NAC common statements could not hide that fact that "Egypt 
and Sweden were barely speaking" and that the NAC members were pursuing individual 
139 H. Muller, "The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Reasons and Consequences of Failure and Options for 
Repair," p. 6. 
140 J.Cirincione, "Failure in New York," The suggestion was that the US non-proliferation and counter-
proliferation stance insisting that a focus solely on the prevention of the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons 
sidelined disarmament issues. 
141 R. Johnson, "Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed." 
142 R. Green, "Fast track to zero nuclear weapons: the Middle Powers Initiative a briefing book". 
143 Ibid. 
34 
interests and agendas. 144 Two individual NAC member states did playa prominent role in the 
2005 RevCon but on their own, did not contribute in an effective manner. Egypt played a 
large role in negotiating the wording of the proposed agenda and was not "particularly 
cooperative"; 145 however, Rebecca Johnson suggests that Egypt appeared to have a 
"constructive regime building motivation" in contrast to the United States and Iran's narrow 
self-interest. 146 The nomination of Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil) as the 
RevCon President was largely due to Brazil's role in 2000 as NAC member and its 
association with the NAM. Whilst it was suggested by New Zealand that Duarte was 
"dignified, consultative and patient,,,147 the results of the meeting suggest that he was 
ineffective, constrained by the hostile context and the irreconcilable positions held by a few 
, 
states that made the role of the President close to impossible. International circumstances in 
this context were extremely unfavourable and offered few opportunities for middle powers 
such as the NAC to mediate or bridge these concerns; however the opportunities that were 
available were not exploited effectively. 
The contribution of the New Agenda Coalition to the nuclear disarmament norm 
John Simpson suggests that given the "new environment of fragmentation of large groupings 
and of cross-cutting interests groups only active, multilinked states will be able to achieve 
their aims and objectives.,,148 Simpson suggests that the main contribution of the NAC to the 
outcome of the 2000 conference was the structural and organisational approach taken, which 
represents an evolution of conference diplomacy. While the NAC was undoubtedly 
successful as a platform for middle power disarmament advocacy between 1998 and 2000, 
the broader significance ofthis coalition as a platform for the long-term development of the 
nuclear disarmament norm is subject to certain conditions. 
The NAC touched upon a number of potentially successful strategies, but may not have 
exercised these strategies to their full potential. This raises a number of questions concerning 
what more these states could have done to advance the norm of nuclear disarmament. In 
particular, the capacity of middle powers to exercise leadership in a hostile international 
security context is the Achilles heel of this thesis. While it was extremely difficult for the 
144 J. Simpson, "Nuclear Arms Control: Appendix 6B. The 2000 NPT Review Conference," p. 487. 
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middle power states to exert an influence in 2005, despite the pressures, there were 
opportunities available to the middle power states of the NAC that were not used to the 
coalition's advantage. Could the NAC have mitigated the constraining influences more 
successfully? What expectations can legitimately be placed on middle power states? 
The NAC made a contributed to nuclear disarmament by developing a package of policies 
that attempted to address the causes of the problem, and presented clear and tangible policy 
solutions. At the outset this position appeared to be reasonable and was accepted by all states 
parties in 2000; however, the immediate collapse of this consensus suggests that this effort 
was wholly insufficient to bring about long-lasting change in NWS decision-making. The 
dynamics of international politics constrained what influence the NAC did exert in 2000. 
The consensus outcome at the 2000 RevCon was a necessary first step to shore up state 
support for this non-proliferation regime. It is however, only the first step of many and as 
such many of the 13 Steps are yet to be implemented. 149 • The development of such a 
comprehensive implementation strategy is not within the ambit of the RevCon Process or a 
middle power coalition like the NAC. Beyond the submission of working papers to the 
PrepCom in 2008 and 2008, questions remain as to whether the NAC could have played a 
greater role in the implementation of the 13 Step objectives. 
The brief time period (1998-2000) ofNAC influence is insufficient to guarantee a long term 
contribution to the process of disarmament. While the coalition remains intact, subsequent 
working papers have done little to maintain momentum. Moreover, the NAC outlined broad 
objectives which left the coalition vulnerable to internal dispute over the direction of specific 
objectives. The NAC could have improved its advocacy by undertaking the following 
actions: (1) maintaining momentum on the issues or policies, (2) implementing progress 
(based on commitments and agreement undertaken), (3) maintaining internal cohesion within 
the coalition, (4) guaranteeing the longevity of the coalition to ensure a consistent presence, 
(5) framing both the issues and the solutions more accurately and effectively (with due regard 
to the operating environment, (6) defining specific objectives, policies or deliverables at the 
149 The implementation of Article VI requires a profound change in the organisation of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime and as a starting point, there must be greater uniformity oflegal and political obligations. It 
involves reducing both the level of armaments and reliance on these weapons in security policies; yet, as states 
such as the NWS argue, it is just as necessary to implement the conditions that would enable such reductions to 
have a positive impact on international security. 
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outset and (7) the creation of an environment that will support disarmament. 150 As the 
following chapters will investigate, there appears to be a certain amount of scope for the 
coalition to manoeuvre. 
150 Director General S. Kongstad, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seminar: A Nordic Initiativefor 
Nuclear Abolition, Oslo 15 April 2009, National Consultative Committee on Disarmament Annual Conference 
2009 (papers) p.4. 
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Chapter Four: Alternative approaches to middle power advocacy in nuclear non-
proliferation regime 
This chapter focuses on the alternative coalition strategies that have been demonstrated by 
middle powers within the nuclear non-proliferation regime environment. This chapter 
considers the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Group of Five (NATO-5) as an alternative 
example of a middle power coalition and then turns to the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), 
the Seven Nation Initiative (7NI) and the independent nuclear commissions (from the 
Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security (Palme Commission) through to the 
International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND)). Middle 
power states have invested in transnational advocacy networks and independent international 
commissions to complement state-led action. Consequently, there is a broader range of 
diplomatic strategies available to middle power states which employ a cooperative approach 
than the NAC or NATO-5 would suggest. In addition, this chapter demonstrates that these 
middle power states have a capacity to tailor their diplomacy to suit specific circumstances or 
to pursue specific objectives. This analysis will be framed be the moderator variables and will 
consider in particular the capacity ofthe middle power entrepreneur, where these states have 
successfully framed the norm, identified the problem, clarified the policy solutions and 
mitigated international constraints. 
While it is important to recognise the limitations inherent to middle power diplomacy, these 
alternative approaches provide options to remedy the shortcomings in the NAC approach 
identified in the previous chapter. 151 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Group of Five (NATO-5) 
The NATO-5 is an informal grouping of five European middle power states including 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. It originated in 1999 with a Belgian 
proposal for "a CD working group for talks on nuclear disarmament (as opposed to an ad hoc 
committee).,,152 This nuclear security coalition has provided a platform for the member states 
to advocate for a number of specific issues including the NATO nuclear sharing arrangement, 
the removal of tactical weapons from the NATO territories, the early entry into force of the 
CTBT and increased transparency regarding the number of warheads, delivery systems and 
151 See for example p. 36 of this thesis. 
152 R. Johnson, Midnight Oil on Troubled Waters, Sixth NPT Review Conference, Briefing No 14, (May 16, 
2000), retrieved February 28,2010 from <URL: http://www.acronym.org.ukinpt/npt14.htm>. 
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stocks of fissile materials. 153 This group was active at the 2000 RevCon, but was not as 
engaged as the NAC in active conference diplomacy. Instead, the NATO-5 supported the 
NAC-sponsored 'middle ground.' The NATO-5 was noted to have voiced criticism over a 
revised draft of the 2000 RevCon Main Committee I text suggesting that the language was 
too weak. The NATO-5 was in favour of increased transparency "with regard to [NWS] 
nuclear capabilities and agreements as a voluntary confidence building measure" and they 
considered that the "paragraph on non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons had been watered 
down too far.,,154 
The NATO-5 coalition has been employed by the member states to accomplish very different 
and much more limited objectives. The NATO-5 is an example of a breakout group, 
advocating for policy change from within a major UN voting bloc. While the coalition has 
issued broad statements on middle ground issues, it has advocated for relatively specific, 
NATO related concerns. As a smaller, more homogenous group (all European NATO middle 
powers) this group is more likely to share similar values; however, where some parties have 
held stronger views on certain issues, they have broken out into a smaller group still, the 
NATO-3 (Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands), which has taken a more proactive stand. 155 
This issue specificity has been effective, avoiding the sort of internal disputes that divided 
and incapacitated the NAC. The narrow focus and limited geographic spread of coalition 
membership is appropriate for issues relating to the NATO bloc; but is unlikely to achieve 
broad appeal (outside NATO). The membership of the coalition, issue specificity and internal 
cohesion (within the coalition) are critical factors as these informal efforts are "fragile at the 
detaillevel.,,156 
This coalition has liaised with other NATO states such as Canada, Denmark, Japan, Finland, 
Spain and Sweden on an ad hoc basis. 157 These flexible relationships allow the core states to 
expand membership where appropriate, and retain cohesion of the core group. Again, this 
dynamic should mean that internal tensions are less likely to get in the way of concerted 
advocacy. This loosely affiliated coalition is less ambitious and structured than the NAC, 
which makes it easier for the core group of states to cooperate with other middle powers that 
share similar NATO-related concerns. The flipside however, is that the ad hoc !informal 
153 M. Kurosawa, "Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament," Osaka University, Japan, retrieved February 27, 
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nature of this group means that states are less likely to invest or remain committed to the 
advocacy to its natural conclusion. In this example, rather than the policy disputes that 
challenged the NAC, the flexible nature of this coalition structure has resulted in stresses 
within the group over emphasis and tactics. 158 
Consequently, the NATO-5 was most active around the time of its inception and acted largely 
below the radar (or not at all in the last decade). This group has been opportunistic, acting on 
issues only where there has been scope to voice their opinion. In comparison to the NAC 
(which established a very high profile and ambitious advocacy campaign), there is no 
expectation on the NATO-5 states to maintain a consistent presence. This has meant that the 
NATO-5 has not achieved any notable influence to date; however, as a strategy the NATO-5 
states have greater flexibility to wield the coalition as a tool when appropriate. This is a 
pragmatic and realistic tactic given the fact that their policies were largely overlooked by the 
three NATO NWS in the last decade. In the lead up to the 2010 RevCon, the NATO-5 re-
emerged to request the removal oftactical nuclear weapons from their territories. 159 This is an 
important step in the disarmament debate and a very visible symbol of shifting attitudes 
within NATO. The NATO-5 statement was well timed (ahead of the May RevCon) and 
launched the tactical weapons debate onto the international agenda at a time when both the 
NPT and NATO force postures are under review. 160 
Transnational Advocacy Networks 
As previously touched upon in Chapter Two, the middle power state-NGO relationship can 
form an important facet of middle power state advocacy. This relationship can provide 
middle power coalitions with a competitive advantage as the knowledge, skills, resources and 
networks bought to the table by civil society, NGOs and epistemic communities are assets 
where public sector resources are limited. International relations now resembles a "three level 
game" in recognition of the role of international, domestic, and transnational (non-
governmental) actors. 161 Transnational actors operate outside or on the periphery of the non-
proliferation regime and expand the scope of the middle power advocacy platform by 
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providing alternative channels through which to communicate with the international 
community. 162 Participation in these networks, in partnership or as joint ventures, enables 
middle power states to communicate directly with civil society and government officials in 
receiving countries. 163 The middle power state tendency to foster close relationships with 
civil society fuses traditional diplomatic methods and public diplomacy and has been 
reflected in the middle power coalitions. 164 State-NGO partnerships have proven to be the key 
to the viability and longevity of these coalitions. Additionally, these transnational networks, 
which are increasingly visible as actors in the non-proliferation regime, demonstrate a variety 
of strategies that compliment middle power diplomacy and could be adopted by the state-led 
coalitions. 
The Middle Powers Initiative 
The MPI is a transnational advocacy network comprised of eight international NGOS. 165 The 
MPI was established in 1998 to create a middle power coalition (based on similar efforts in 
the Ottawa Process and World Court Project) to advance the disarmament objective ofthe 
MPI NGOS. 166 Middle power states make attractive partners for transnational networks, as 
these states provide a vehicle for NGOs to access and influence state-level debate. The 
independent launch of the NAC in 1998 coincided with this initiative and assumed the role 
envisaged by the MPI coalition a year earlier than expected. 167 The MPI developed a close 
relationship with the NAC countries and played an important role in mobilising civil society 
and governments in support ofthe NAC in 1999/2000,168 acting as a bridge between global 
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civil society (grassroots activism and elite/ state level action), 169 the NAC states and other 
states party to the NPT. 
As a transnational network comprised of national and international NGOs, the MPI is 
different in structure and capacity to a middle power state-led coalition; however, MPI 
activities complemented the diplomacy of the NAC states. These complementary actions can 
inform future middle power advocacy in two ways. Firstly, middle power coalition 
partnerships with transnational networks are a very useful method to support middle power 
foreign ministries. It is difficult to determine the exact influence of the MPI on NAC policy; 
however, this state-NGO relationship was an important (functional) part of the NAC success. 
The MPI proved to be a valuable asset for the NAC by expanding the resources available to 
the NAC in the lead up to the 2000 RevCon. 170 The MPI promoted the NAC objectives 
throughout the international community and in particular, the MPI focused on the NATO 
states, as NATO's influential opposition to the NAC objectives was apparent in UN voting on 
the NAC resolutions in 1998 and 1999 (and also in Slovenia's withdrawal from the NAC). 
MPI delegations visited Canada, Germany, the Netherlands (as well as NATO allies Japan 
and Australia) to establish support for the NAC position. 171 The MPI diversified the channels 
of communication channels available to the NAC diplomats by including former senior 
political leaders and parliamentarians to reach a very different audience from a purely state-
based (track I) negotiations. 172 
Middle power states could utilise the diplomatic strategies adopted by the MPI to achieve 
longevity, maintain momentum and to formulate policy. The MPI remained intact (despite the 
changing international circumstances) because it developed a formalised organisational 
structure with permanent staff and offices. The development of a formal structure by a middle 
power coalition would require an initial investment (which may not be practical or 
achievable), but the formality would ensure the commitment of parties over a longer term. 
The MPI mitigated the waning influence of the NAC (the MPls main vehicle for influence) 
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by developing flexible, more consultative relationships with a large pool of (up to 25) middle 
power states. 173 This flexible and consultative character was useful to increase the 
membership of the middle power grouping but it diluted the influence of the MPI, as policy 
formation is much harder with a larger group. The loosely affiliated states did not form an 
active state coalition, making it difficult to promote new policy beyond this self selected 
group. 
The most visible and perhaps important function of the MPI was the creation of 'informal 
spaces to debate policy,' or track II forums where diplomats and civil society can develop 
new policy ideas outside the official setting with relative freedom. 174 These ideas can then be 
taken back to capitals and disseminated. The MPI for example, established the Article VI 
forum to "stimulate and shape effective responses to the crisis of the non-proliferation / 
disarmament regime manifested by the breakdown of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.,,175 
The advantage provided by the coalition dynamic stems from the coalition capacity to 
develop quality policies. Improving this capacity through formal and informal consultation 
could complement coalition efforts to formulate viable polices. 
The Seven Nation Initiative 
The Seven Nation Initiative (7NI) was launched in 2007 by Australia, Chile, Indonesia, 
Norway, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom. This is an example of a collective 
effort by a group of middle power states to accurately identify and respond the challenges 
facing the non-proliferation regime. 176 This platform is notable for three reasons: (1) it 
involves a NWS, the United Kingdom. (2) These states have established a relationship with a 
broad network ofNGOs, civil society and academic institutions. (3) It was as a clearinghouse 
mechanism to facilitate the exchange of information and identify further areas for 
173 There is a self-selecting group of middle power states which attend events at the invitation ofthe MPI 
including Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile Costa Rica, Egypt, Germany, Italy Iceland, 
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South Korea, Sweden, and Ukraine. 
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cooperation. This initiative is something of a hybrid as it is part middle power state coalition-
part transnational coalition. 
The inclusion of the United Kingdom dramatically changes the dynamic of the middle power 
grouping as a micro-climate for the development of new policy. While the 7NI middle power 
states represent a diverse geographical and political spread, (including members from all the 
influential voting blocs- the EU, the NAM, NATO and the Western Group and Others) the 
inclusion of the United Kingdom increases the likelihood that this group will be able to 
develop persuasive and feasible policies. In addition, the inclusion of the UK could 
strengthen the NWS-NNWS relationship, which was critical to the 2000 outcome. It also 
opens the way for increased cooperation between NWS and NNWS. Such cooperation can 
already be seen in the form of the Norway-United Kingdom-VERTIC initiative. This 
initiative addresses the technical issues involved in creating a verifiable disarmament solution 
(acceptable to NWS and NNWS alike). 177 Rather than overt policy advocacy, this group has 
invested in the technical measures to advance disarmament. This initiative is similar to earlier 
efforts byNAC members Sweden, New Zealand and Mexico and (and Norway), who in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s "began developing technical capabilities and international 
communication sharing networks to monitor nuclear tests worldwide.,,178 This was an ad hoc 
group that demonstrated the verification capabilities required for the CTBT even though the 
NWS had not started negotiations. It was this demonstration of feasibility that overcame the 
blocks in negotiations. 179 It is difficult to assess whether these practical initiatives or 'skilled 
conference diplomacy' have a greater influence on the emerging norm, rather such efforts are 
complementary. 
While the 7NI is a state-led coalition, the group's relationship with NGOs, civil society and 
academic institutions has meant that this coalition also reflects the characteristics of a 
transnational advocacy network (at least in terms of information exchange between 
international actors). The 7NI states have sponsored and coordinated a number ofprojects 
from civil society partners. This group is not intended to replace existing arrangements rather, 
it aims to complement current activity as these states continue to participate in other 
groupings and coalitions. The 7NI objectives suggest that this platform could be developed as 
177 H. Elbahtimy, "VERTIC UK- Norway Initiative: mapping progress," retrieved February 28,2010 from 
<URL:http://www. vertic. org/ assetslEventsIUK -Norway%20 Ini tia ti ve-FINAL. pdf>. 
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a bridge between these groups in the NPT review process. 180 It is clear that this coalition has 
adopted a more subtle, technical and nuanced approach to policy development and advocacy 
than the very visible NAC; however, to date, the 7NI has not been utilised as a platform for 
disarmament advocacy in traditional negotiating forums. Instead, this group has been active 
behind the scenes to "extend consensus" on disarmament and non-proliferation concerns. 
181 The 7NI is still in its infancy and the contribution of the coalition to the norm of 
disarmament is unknown; however, it has taken strategic decision to align the middle power 
coalition approach with a NWS and a transnational network. This certainly increases the 
likelihood that this coalition will achieve longevity, contribute to high-level policy 
development and implement practical solutions. 
International Commissions and State Sponsored Reports 
This section addresses middle power state-sponsored international commissions including: 
the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security (Palme Commission), sponsored 
by Sweden, which published the report Our Common Security report in 1982, the Canberra 
Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Canberra Commission), sponsored by 
Australia, which published the Canberra Report in 1 996,the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament (Tokyo Forum), sponsored by Japan, which published the 
Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century report in 1999, the Weapons 
of Mass destruction Commission (Blix Commission) which published the Weapons of Terror 
report in 1996, also sponsored by Sweden, and the International Commission on Nuclear Non 
Proliferation and Disarmament (ICCND), sponsored by Australian and Japan, which 
published the report Eliminating Nuclear Threats - A Practical Agenda for Global 
Policymakers in 2009. 
These commissions offer alternative strategies that may also benefit middle power advocacy 
coalitions. As Marianne Hanson states, the emergence of these commissions has 
"represented an important shift in agency and norm reinforcement in global politics, a 
new area of intersection between governmental and non-governmental processes, and 
reflected a novel move away from traditional great power negotiations on security 
180 1. O. St0re, in M. A Pomper, 1. O. St0re, K Subrahmanyam, T.R Pickering, 1. Dhanapala, "The Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty: The Next 40 Years," Arms Control Today, 38, 5, (June 2008), p. 6. 
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issues. At a concrete level, these reports were the tangible results of the keenness felt 
by these Advocacy States to promote disarmament norms.,,182 
International commissions differ markedly from their coalition counterparts. Rather than 
involving direct state-led engagement in disarmament advocacy, the commissions provide 
middle powers with a state-sponsored platform to focuses on conceptual and policy 
development. While it is not possible to compare the contribution made by commissions to 
middle power coalitions, the commissions are sponsored by middle powers and it makes 
sense to consider what elements of the commission approach, if any, could benefit future 
middle power coalitions. 
The commission-style diplomacy offers a very different method by which to develop new 
policy solutions. These commissions specialise in high-level policy formation and take a 
more academic and investigative approach to the disarmament issue than could be expected 
of a state coalition as the independent commissioners are often experts in highly specialised 
fields. The policy development and (initial) advocacy is undertaken by a panel of independent 
international commissioners from a variety of states. As a 'focus group' commissions engage 
in "systematic enquiry designed to bring new general ideas and specific proposals to a 
problem of international or global significance.,,183 These commissions are a temporary 
feature ofthe international landscape; however, the reports and recommendations often 
remain part of the international dialogue for at least five years. 184 These commissions have 
proved particularly effective as platforms from which to capture global public interest for a 
specific period of time and have been useful to direct public attention to a problem. 
Despite being discrete organisations, with no temporal overlap, these independent nuclear 
commissions have contributed to the collective development and evolution of nuclear 
disarmament as a norm. This independence is a useful vehicle for middle powers to propagate 
concepts that the states themselves may not be able to advocate directly. The commissions 
draw attention to the issues not the governments behind them. Notable contributions include 
the .. Palme Commission, the first public, high-level acknowledgment of the low military utility 
of nuclear weapons and the futility of nuclear warfare, sentiments that continue to underline 
182 M. Hanson, "The Advocacy States: Their Normative Role Before and After the U.S. Call for Nuclear Zero," 
p.75. 
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the current disarmament debate. 185 It was also the first example of a middle power state's 
attempt to lead on the 'high' political subject of nuclear security and disarmament. 
Additionally, the Canberra Commission refuted the strategic, technological and political 
arguments against nuclear elimination that emerged at the end of the Cold War, in a 
comprehensive and detailed manner. 186 The most recent international commission- the 
ICNND, sought bring a pragmatic face to disarmament, building on previous effort (Canberra 
and Tokyo) positioning its report to precede the 2010 Review Conference, to be the basis for 
successful negotiations on a consensus document in the lead up the May Conference. 187 This 
independence can be considered to be an asset as it provides the state-sponsored commission 
with a certain amount of freedom to develop forward-thinking ambitious policies. 188 
Engaging complementary strategies 
These commissions demonstrate that it is possible for middle power states to initiate the 
development of viable policies but these states many not need to be involved in the advocacy 
of the policies themselves. The fact that the commission outcomes are largely independent 
from the state-sponsor may have a positive repercussion. In spite of the Howard 
Government's decision not to support the Canberra Commission Report, Austria, Brazil and 
Sweden used this Report to call for greater consideration of nuclear weapons elimination in 
the context ofthe CD agenda and the NAC countries embraced these principles driving them 
forward into the 2000 Rev Con. 189 Individual commissioners including General Lee Butler 
and Robert McNamara also adopted the role that, under different circumstances, the 
Australian government might have been expected to play. 190 This example demonstrates the 
vulnerability of middle power advocacy to changing governments and domestic resource 
constraints. It also demonstrates that the commission reports can contribute to norm advocacy 
with minimum effort on the part of the sponsoring state. Middle power state-sponsored 
185 G. Wiseman, "The Palme Commission: New Thinking about Security," in Thakur R., Cooper A. F. and 
English J. (eds.), International Commissions and the Power of Ideas, United Nations University Press (June 
2005), p. 63. 
186 "The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Report (Part One): The Nuclear 
Weapon Debate," Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, (January 1997) 
retrieved September 10, 2007 from <http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html>. 
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commissions could provide a valuable alternative where it is not possible to guarantee the 
longevity of a middle power coalition advocacy. 
Middle powers could appropriate aspects of the commission approach to enhance the 
efficiency of the coalition effort. Given that these commissions began as state-sponsored 
initiatives, it is not inconceivable that this style of policy formation could translate into the 
coalition context. Middle power coalitions could mimic this commission activity by 
designating experts from each state to form a commission on a policy area of concern or the 
coalition could invest in a partnership with a commission (much like the transnational 
advocacy network partnerships as previously discussed). 191 A partnership between an 
international commission and middle power coalition could benefit both parties. Japan and 
Australia have taken an individualistic approach to the ICNND report of 2009. 192 Japan has 
proposed a separate 11 point plan for the 2010 RevCon, whereas Australia has largely been 
quiet on the issue. Had the ICNND report been received by a middle power coalition, the 
dynamic created may have been quite effective. 193 
In addition, diplomatic strategies that take into account the inherent limitations of the middle 
power states and the coalition approach are more likely to succeed. Middle power norm 
entrepreneurs need to take into account the internal disputes, external pressures and limited 
resources that may cause these states to withdraw from the coalition or fail to maintain 
momentum on the policy positions they once sought to advocate. Moreover, the lengthy 
process of disarmament advocacy is vulnerable to the waning political will and state 
disinterest, requiring the repeated investment of large amounts of diplomatic resources to 
maintain the visibility of the issue. There is a synergy or dynamism that can be generated 
through engaging in strategies that complement the state-led advocacy of a middle power 
coalition including the state-NGO partnership or policies that can operate independently of 
the state advocates. 194 
191 See for example p. 39 of this thesis. 
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Chapter Five: The contribution of middle power coalitions to conventional and non-
nuclear WMD disarmament 
"Two things are very expensive in international life: promises when they 
succeed and threats when they fail." 195 
Middle power states have made extensive use of the coalition platform outside of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime, generating conventional and non-nuclear WMD disarmament 
momentum. These examples reinforce the proposition that coalitions provide a viable and 
important platform for middle power disarmament diplomacy. These coalitions have be 
instrumental in the negotiation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APM Treaty) of 
. 1997 and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CMC) of 2008 as a part of the Ottawa 
Process and Oslo Process, respectively. These middle power coalitions have also improved 
the function of the non-nuclear WMD disarmament treaties (the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) of 1972 and the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on their Destruction (CWC) of 1992). In particular, the JACKSNNZ biological weapons 
coalition aimed to provide support for the RevCon process. In addition, a coalition of middle 
powers has provided support for the negotiations for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). As Ko 
Colijn notes, middle powers have used their 'like-mindedness' as a useful tool to advocate for 
broadly-endorsed strategies, or specific country-directed or threat-directed measures. 196 
This thesis argues that the middle power coalition strategies adopted outside of the non-
proliferation regime can inform future nuclear disarmament diplomacy. These coalitions 
involve the same 'usual suspect' middle powers operating in very different normative 
environments. This comparison offers insight into alternative strategies that these coalitions 
can employ to take advantage of opportunities and constraints that may arise. The Ottawa and 
Oslo Processes present as a more developed versions of the nuclear coalitions seen in the 
NAC and the NATO-5 examples. These coalitions suggest that there is potential for middle 
power states to improve their disarmament advocacy. In particular, these middle power 
coalitions have made extensive use of transnational advocacy networks, non-traditional or 
fast-track treaty negotiation and sideline events to support a RevCon style framework. As in 
195Thomas Schelling quote in E. Sidlow and B. Henschen, America at Odds, Wadsworth Publishing, Fifth 
Edition, (July 2005) p. 380. 
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preceding chapters, the analysis of these coalitions is framed by the moderator variables. This 
chapter focuses on the influence of the coalition capacity to frame the norm and the 
characteristics of the issue (the stakeholders, the states responsible (and liable), the utility of 
the weapons, the complexity of the solution and the feasibility of implementation) in more 
detail. 
Conventional and non-nuclear WMD disarmament comparisons 
This chapter does not seek to compare conventional and nuclear weapons, except to propose 
that the different characteristics of each weapons category can be accommodated within the 
template of moderator variables. When viewed from within this framework the conventional, 
non-nuclear WMD and nuclear disarmament processes can be loosely compared as the 
moderator variables enable a controlled comparison of these case studies. The study of 
nuclear disarmament can benefit from avoiding the arbitrary distinctions between 
conventional and strategic disarmament. Rather, the processes should be seen as 
complimentary and should be seen as part of a single spectrum of activity that seeks to limit 
the use, deployment and manufacture or certain categories of weapons deemed international 
humanitarian law. 197 The distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons has 
become increasingly blurred as technology advances and the role of weapons in security 
strategies changes. Moreover, the definition 'weapons of mass destruction' is a socially 
constructed category because their utility is first and foremost political and the deployment of 
'tactical nuclear warheads' challenges these distinctions further. 198 
The Ottawa Process and the middle power coalition 
The Ottawa Process was driven by a coalition of middle power states in partnership with a 
transnational network ofNGOs (the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL». In 
1995, a group of pro-ban nations (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, 
Norway and Switzerland) formed the core ofa group of middle power states that 
subsequently worked closely together throughout the Process. The Ottawa Process concluded 
197 The relationship between conventional and strategic weapons has long been contentious. Conventional 
weapons asymmetry is a key challenge for proponents of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons are perceived 
as the great equaliser (a balance to conventional asymmetry). Additionally, the largely umestrained trade in 
conventional weapons is the by product of the restrictions in place around nuclear weapons. L. A. Dunn, "Some 
Reflections on the "Dove's Dilemma" International Organization, 35, 1 Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the 
Chain, (Winter 1981), p. 181. 
198 The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy "'Tactical' Nuclear Weapons: 
A dangerous anachronism," NPT Briefings: 2010 and Beyond, retrieved May 14, 2009 from 
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the APM Treaty in 14 months (relative to other treaty negotiation process this is an incredibly 
short timeframe). The middle power states in this coalition rejected the traditional 
disarmament negotiating forum (the CD) in favour ofa series of independent conferences 
hosted by the states of the coalition. From the outset, the Ottawa Process parties (in particular 
the ICBL) outlined clear treaty objectives and pursued a goal orientated approach to achieve a 
full ban on these weapons. At the same time the core coalition quickly expanded its 
membership to include Brazil, France, Malaysia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and 
Zimbabwe. This coalition endeavoured to consult with all stakeholders; but in reality it was 
only a few of the coalition states that were actively engaged in the drafting ofthe treaty. It 
was this departure from the traditional incremental approach (and consensus-based) based 
treaty negotiation in favour of a dynamic fast-track approach (led by a small negotiating 
team) that produced an APL Treaty draft in 14 months. 199 
The Oslo Process and the middle power coalition 
The Oslo Process recreated the dynamic of the Ottawa Process to address cluster munitions 
(which based on impact) posed the gravest danger to civilian populations,zoo The coalition 
dynamic in the Ottawa Process created a supportive environment for the middle power states 
to pursue leadership positions and was reinforced by a positive rivalry between the leading 
states Canada, Sweden and Norway who engaged in a 'leadership competition. ,201 Spurred on 
by the success of the Ottawa Process, Norway initiated the Oslo Process in February 2007, 
which concluded the CMC in 2008. Norway led a coalition of middle power states which had 
previously been party to the Ottawa Process (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, New Zealand, 
Norway, Peru arid Sweden). The Oslo Process followed the same format (a series of 
conferences to negotiate and draft the treaty), a similar organisational structure, clear 
communications strategy, and many of the same NGO partners as had been involved in the 
Ottawa Process 10 years earlier. One new development concerned a number of the core 
cluster munitions coalition states which undertook unilateral efforts to restrict the use of 
cluster munitions prior to engaging in the campaign.202 Because of the capacity previously 
199 R. M. Behringer, "Middle Powers and the Human Security Agenda," p. 305. 
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developed in the Ottawa Process the Oslo Process was noted for the highly efficient use of 
resources available, achieving a remarkable level of success in a very short space of time. 
The middle power state-NGO partnership 
The success of the Ottawa Process has been largely attributed to the dynamic relationship 
generated by middle power state/ NGO cooperation. This partnership was an early objective 
of the parties to the Process.203 The core group of middle power states demonstrated a 
remarkable degree of cooperation with the transnational NGO network (the International 
Campaign to ban Landmines (ICBL)) given the generally antagonistic relationship between 
states and NGOs. 204 While the dynamism of the process is attributed to this cooperation, the 
diplomatic advances made could not have been achieved without the coalition of core middle 
power states, as the "the ICBL would never have been able to engage in the diplomatic 
lobbying necessary to negotiate a convention. ,,205 The middle power coalition provided the 
ICBL with unprecedented access to the negotiating process, including the ICBL members as 
on state delegations. 206 In this way, the ICBL was able to place pressure on reluctant 
countries in forums that had previously been restricted to diplomats. In turn, the middle 
power state-NGO partnership strengthened the bargaining position of the middle power 
coalition. The ICBL provided the middle power states with information, resources and public 
support. 207 In addition to the development of a functional negotiating system and the full 
backing of its own political system (including decision makers in the Department of 
Defence), the NGO community was instrumental in facilitating Canadian leadership of the 
Ottawa Process.208 
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Establishing a new norm 
Both conventional weapons and non-nuclear WMD disarmament initiatives are based on the 
premise that normative constraints can challenge, and in some cases override, the utility value 
of these weapons. The Ottawa Process and the Oslo Process created strong international 
norms prohibiting the use of landmines and cluster munitions amongst states party to treaties, 
which is a significant achievement given that these weapons were previously the subject of 
widespread use. While both conventions fall short of the level of universality required to 
result in the full disarmament of these weapons categories (the largest stockholders remain 
outside of the treaties), the resulting prohibition even at current ratification levels carries 
significant normative weight. The norms created by the Ottawa and Oslo Processes have 
influenced the behaviour of outlier states and the international community's response to the 
use of these weapons. This shift in attitude can be noted in the United States landmines policy 
of2004.209 The international community's widespread condemnation ofIsrael's use of cluster 
munitions against Lebanon in 2006, Russia's use of the weapons against Georgia in 2008 and 
the United Kingdom reversal of its position in May 2008 also give weight to this 
proposition.21o 
It is the behaviour, and behaviour changes in these outlier states that is critical to this 
analysis. While the Ottawa and Oslo Processes have impacted future costibenefits analysis of 
these states,211 the treaties have not (as yet) changed the existing standard of behaviour for 
the outlier states, as these states continue to deploy these weapons. In the 13 years since the 
adoption the APL Treaty, efforts to universalise this prohibition have not been successful and 
the primary stockholders of these weapons (China, India, Israel, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, 
and the United States) remain largely outside this treaty. A similar initiative in the nuclear 
weapons context may impact the future acquisition, deployment or use of nuclear weapons by 
changing the interest calculation, but is unlikely to change the current behaviours of these 
209 This policy outlines United States' plans to cease deployment (outside of South Korea) from 2010. This 
policy does not explicitly refer to the anti-Iandmine norm; however, the United States ceased production of 
landmines shortly after the APM Treaty was opened for signature. See United States: Country Profile, 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, retrieved March 7,2009, from <http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lrnl2004/usa.html> and United States Department of State, US 
Landmines Policy, retrieved May 13,2009 from <http://www.state.gov/t/prnlwra/c11735.htm>. 
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states. Such an approach may be useful to influence future nuclear policies (such as the right 
to use or deploy the weapons), but will not be appropriate if the objective requires a 
significant shift in current behaviour (such as requiring states dismantle production capacity). 
Involving the outlier states in treaty negotiations 
A number ofthe great powers were involved in the early movement to ban landmines, but 
remain outside the treaty framework because the Ottawa Process did not sufficiently address 
strategic, practical and financial concerns of these states. Similarly, key stockholders were 
not involved in the Oslo Process negotiations. Early (landmine) disarmament efforts initiated 
by France and the United States were based around the CD and the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW). 212 The Clinton Administration demonstrated United States 
commitment to a moratorium and a twelve-part 'United States-United Kingdom control 
regime' and attempted to find a compromise between detractors (primarily military) and 
proponents of the ban. However, the United States was tom between its military duties as a 
superpower and a desire to pursue a moral foreign policy.213 The ban on the use of these 
weapons was complicated by engagement in the former Yugoslavia and South Korea. Like 
the Ottawa Process, the Oslo Process was motivated by frustrations in the CD regarding the 
slow progress on efforts to address the humanitarian impact of these weapons. Many 
commentators and states argue that the rejection of the CD weakens the international 
humanitarian law effort214 strength of prohibition derived from consensus on the issue. This 
argument hinges on the "notion that the CCW has "all the stakeholders" involved and that 
"major powers" and the big users, producers, and stockpilers of cluster munitions are only 
willing to engage in the CCW context.,,215 
The goal-orientated, fast track approach undertaken by both Ottawa and Oslo Processes 
resulted in two of the most comprehensive disarmament treaties to date, prohibiting the 
stockpiling and use of these weapons and providing compensation to the victims of these 
weapons. The key failing however, is the inability to capture the outlying states within the 
treaty prohibitions. Given the seriousness (and high-stakes) of the nuclear disarmament 
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debate, it is not appropriate or feasible to rely only a normative prohibition; rather the legal 
(treaty) provisions must include the stockholders of the weapons.216 It was a fatal negotiating 
flaw on the part of the Ottawa Process parties to refuse exemptions, leaving the United States 
with little choice to refrain from entering into the APM Treaty.217 In the context of nuclear 
disarmament a fast-track approach to treaty negotiation may prove insufficient to advance the 
disarmament norm beyond the current level of support and such an exclusive negotiating 
process may also prove to politically divisive (defeating the purpose of multilateral nuclear 
disarmament). While the Ottawa/ Oslo Process may not easily translate into the nuclear 
disarmament context and a full ban on nuclear weapons may not be currently feasible, on a 
more specific, strategic (operational level) there are a number oflessons that could be 
translated. In particular the dynamic of the parties to the coalitions and the strategies 
employed to support the norm promotion. 
Framing of the norm 
The landmines and cluster munitions conventions were successful because they lent 
themselves to a single norm, one that supported "their outright ban to halt the humanitarian 
devastation under one single international treaty.',2lS The Ottawa and Oslo Processes were 
also successful because the middle power states framed the new no~~ by grafting these onto 
existing norms and standards of behaviour including humanitarian law and the 'just war 
doctrine' that included the norm of civilian protection.219 The Oslo Process was able to frame 
the anti-cluster munitions norm an extension of the landmines norm rather establish a new 
one.
220 The drafters of the CMC made explicit reference to the 1997 APM Treaty and the 
norm against antipersonnellandmines that it created. The two weapons categories had 
previously been treated as one, but were separated so as to enable more rapid progress on the 
landmines issue (which at the time was a more straightforward case). 221 Both the Ottawa and 
216 States are not able to ensure compliance with a normative prohibition. This low standard of enforcement and 
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Oslo Processes framed the debate in the public realm maintaining the visibility of the issue 
through "symbolic" and "moral leverage" politics.222 The ICBL in particular was effective in 
'naming and shaming' the states that were responsible for the use of the weapons though a 
graphic and visual depiction of the causal story (the states responsible and the individual 
victims). These Processes also framed the debate by recasting the security issues in 
humanitarian rather than purely military terms. These Processes presented a clear solution in 
the form of a legal and normative framework for the eradication of these weapons. 223 
Middle power nuclear weapons disarmament coalitions could benefit from appropriating a 
number of these Ottawa and Oslo Process strategies. It follows that advocates of disarmament 
would be more persuasive if they framed the process of disarmament as a humanitarian issue, 
developed a persuasive case around the utility of the weapon and compensated for the 
weapons (replacement) value.224 The different characteristics of the weapons and the 
disarmament process come into play here. These differences do not change the strategies 
themselves, but rather dictate how the strategies could be best used. 
Middle power advocates of nuclear disarmament have emphasised the humanitarian aspect,225 
but have fallen short raising the profile of the issue to the level that the Ottawa and Oslo 
Processes were able to. Nuclear disarmament is a tricky issue that may not be able to be 
completely recast as a humanitarian concern given the strategic value of the weapons. 
Instead, middle power advocates that wish to frame a persuasive case for nuclear 
disarmament must consider the challenge posed by the utility of the weapon. As the cluster 
munitions example demonstrates, the utility of the weapon complicates the disarmament 
process. The utility value of cluster munitions caused this category to be separated from the 
landmines issue and has resulted in a less comprehensive CMC as a result of a number of 
problematic clauses (relating to this utility).226 Closely associated with the utility value ofthe 
weapon is the replacement value. In the context of nuclear disarmament, there is currently no 
viable alternative to nuclear deterrence (or rather none that have been persuasive). By 
222 M. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, p. 19. 
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comparison, conventional weapons disarmament is made more likely by the relative ease by 
which this weapon can be replaced with another (although one that is more in line with 
humanitarian law). Middle power advocates of nuclear disarmament may not have the 
capacity to identify a viable, non-military strategy to replace these weapons; however, 
disarmament initiatives that focus on more specific objectives could benefit from this 
understanding. As discussed in Chapter Two, disarmament efforts are unlikely to succeed if 
they are seen as a relative decrease in security or a state position.227 For example, the 
withdrawal of tactical nuclear warheads from NATO states may need to be coupled with a 
corresponding security commitment from the United States and Russia parties involved. 
Complexity: the small arms and light weapons example 
Progress on the norm of nuclear disarmament is characterised by the complex norms that 
govern nuclear behaviour. Despite holding positions at opposite ends of the conflict 
escalation spectrum, nuclear disarmament initiatives operate in a similarly complex 
normative environment to efforts to curb the trade in SALW. For example there are multiple 
and often competing norms that govern licit and illicit trade in both weapons.228 Navigating 
this complexity has proved to be a challenge for both nuclear and SAL W disarmament, but 
must be taken into account when developing viable disarmament policies. Unlike the 
antipersonnellandmines and cluster munitions examples, the casual story (the identification 
of the states responsible) is more complex and must be treated with an appropriate level of 
nuance. It is not a simple case oflegitimate/ illegitimate but rather a balancing act between 
rights and obligations (particularly where extended deterrence, nuclear sharing arrangements, 
or the nuclear industry are considered).The normative environment that surrounds SALW 
(like nuclear weapons) suggests that these weapons are "legitimate tools for individual and 
state defence needs and raise a more complex management framework." 229 As a result, 
agreement on a number of different norms addressing the various aspects of weapons related 
activity may be more pragmatic.23o Rather than setting up new norms to compete against 
existing standards, disarmament advocates may benefit from addressing more specific issues 
227 T. Young, "Missile defense: The future of NATO burden sharing?" 
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rather than focus solely on the larger anti-nuclear weapons norm (such as restricting capacity 
to test, employ or use these weapons). 
Moreover, unlike the antipersonnellandmine and cluster munitions counterpart, the 
movement to regulate SAL W at an international level occurs within the UN system. The UN 
has retained control of the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations so as involve all parties in 
consensus-based decision making. 231 This traditional forum provides a greater chance that 
the negotiated outcome will be met with broad acceptance; however as the preceding 
discussion has alluded, concluding such an agreement may be a time-consuming process that 
is low on substance. 232 SAL W efforts adopted the traditional Prep Com! UN Conference 
dynamic, beginning with the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in All its Aspects. The elements of procedural wrangling seen in WMD 
disarmament and arms control efforts were apparent in the SAL W context (including the first 
Prep Com that could not even decide on the date or venue of the Conference).233 
Middle power nuclear disarmament coalitions in the SAL W operate in a similar environment 
to the nuclear disarmament coalitions. There is not a lot of room for middle powers to 
manoeuvre in terms of policy positions or in the actual architecture of the negotiations 
themselves. Instead middle powers involved in SAL W disarmament have supported and 
facilitated the UN Process. Belgium, Canada, Japan, Mali, Norway, South Africa and 
Switzerland formed a core coalition of middle powers within the SAL W process. While these 
states are skilled negotiators, these states have so far failed to gain ground by influencing the 
agenda.234 This coalition has organised a series of meetings and workshops leading up to the 
UN conference between 1998 and 2001 to address all aspects of the SALW issue.235 The 
conferences of note include the Norwegian conference in 1998 establishing the "Elements of 
Common Understanding" and the Belgian conference in 1999 announcing the 98 government 
'Brussels Call for Action. ,236 This group demonstrated characteristics that can be identified 
with middle power coalition approach including the division of labour and burden sharing 
which enables these states to focus on specific (niche roles) (i.e. Belgium (the Brussels Call 
231 S. Brem, "Too much too soon? NOOs and Middle Powers in need for more coordination on small arms 
activities," in Reji·aming the Agenda: The Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International 
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for Action); Canada (international arms register); Japan (ammunition study); Mali (assistance 
to states); Norway (host of meetings); South Africa (proposal of UN Conference); and 
Switzerland (marking and tracing expertise)).237 
Despite these attempts to build a middle power coalition around specific issues such as an 
international mechanism to trace small arms, transparency issues or to address the 
humanitarian impacts, these issues were only included in a weak form in the Program of 
Action.238 This middle power coalition effort increased cross-sectional dialogue and 
cooperation, but beyond this consultation these states were unable to deliver actionable 
outcomes. 239 
Biological weapons disarmament 
As the first disarmament treaty to completely ban an entire class of weapons, the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 is a normative precedent for nuclear disarmament; 
however, it also illustrates the challenges that plague ambitious WMD disarmament 
commitments. While the "Convention is an indispensable legal and political instrument that 
reinforces the widespread condemnation of biological weapons,,,240 this treaty is very much a 
'work in progress' as it lacks strict verification and enforcement capabilities required to 
ensure uniform compliance. The treaty framework itself is inadequate to rigorously monitor 
and enforce compliance; 241 nevertheless, the way in which states parties to the treaty have 
developed the framework through a series of incremental steps within the Review Conference 
process could be useful when building an effective nuclear disarmament regime.242 
237 S. Brem, "Too much too soon? NGOs and Middle Powers in need for more coordination on small arms 
activities" p. 49. 
238 Ibid, p. 51. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons, in All Its Aspects. The Programme of Action (PoA) includes a number of measures at the 
national, regional and global levels, in the areas oflegislation, destruction of weapons that were confiscated, 
seized, or collected, as well as international cooperation and assistance to strengthen the ability of States in 
identifying and tracing illicit arms and light weapons. 
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The JACKSNNZ coalition 
In the context of biological and chemical weapons disarmament the JACKSNNZ group, is the 
. most notable example of middle power coalition activity. This group emerged in the lead up 
to the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Regime, based on the failings of 
the Fifth RevCon in 2001 to negotiate a verification mechanism.243 The states parties failed to 
come to a consensus on a composite text of a verification protocol. This protocol has initially 
been investigated by an expert group on verification (VEREX) and then the States parties 
authorised the Ad Hoc Group under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary 
to negotiate a verification protocol. The failure to achieve consensus on this issue which 
dominated the 2001 RevCon was due to difficulties in resolving the outstanding issues, 
including the small quantities involved, the legit and illicit trade and dual use concerns. Most 
importantly though, the United States rejected the text on the grounds that the intrusive 
inspections the biotechnology industry and government bio-defence program.244 It is in this 
context that the JACKSNNZ group (comprised of Japan, Australia, Canada, (South) Korea, 
Switzerland, Norway and New Zealand) intended to balance the larger groupings of the EU, 
within the Western Group, with its coordinated position. 245 The group espoused the "middle 
ground on which the Sixth Review Conference converged" drawing on the Latin American 
Group of 12 and the EU-plus group of36 recommendations. 246 
JACKSNNZ announced itself as an informal group of countries, sharing similar views, 
working to share ideas, information and approaches on the various issues addressed at the 
Sixth Review Conference.247 This group presented national papers, in consultation with each 
other, but took a "tactical decision to refrain from submitting text systematically, preferring 
to rely on their individual working papers issued in advance and on offering comment on 
other draft texts during the committee stage of the conference.,,248The group appears to value 
informality preferring loose consultation to the more arduous procedures of endorsements 
(similar to the process adopted by the European Union states). If a JACKSNNZ state wanted 
243 N. Sims, The Future of Biological Disarmament, Routledge, First Edition, (April 2009), p. 110. 
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to distance itself from a paper, it could do so by suggesting it was a national working paper 
only. The group also refrained from circulating draft text for the final declaration 
collectively- Australia, New Zealand and Japan circulated textual proposals individually.249 
This loose procedural character may be the key to this group's success and continued 
viability, and is an organised but informal dynamic that could be exported to the nuclear 
context. 
The JACKSNNZ group played a significant part in the successful outcome of the Sixth 
Review Conference, breaking the "stranglehold of the increasingly anachronistic triad of 
Eastern, Western and NAM groupings.,,25o The traditional regional groupings that dominate 
the formal management of such multilateral meetings are weakened by emergence of 
subgroups; as a result less tension is produced. 251 The JACKSNNZ group's loose structure 
and strictly consultative character is "an advantage over the more tightly constrained 
groupings of States Parties" within the regime.252 There is potential for even greater 
significance for the future of the BWC as "components of a more dynamic pattern of 
conference diplomacy, especially if they find ways of using the traditional group structure 
(which is unlikely to disappear) to their advantage.,,253 While the JACKSNNZ group were 
instrumental in orchestrating the convergence of views that resulted in a successful outcome 
at the Sixth Review Conference, success was also due to the fact that the actors involved 
confined their ambitions to modest objectives with the realistic aim to secure a consensus 
outcome.254 Other groups of states that converged on the middle ground included the 'EU-
plus 13' and the 'Latin American 12' (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay). 255 
The JACKSNNZ grouping remains in place between the Review Conferences.256 These states 
are involved in enhancing national legislation, regional and sub-regional cooperation 
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activities as part oftheir Security Council Resolution 1540 obligations. 257 The states divided 
their labour at the 2006 Review Conference, (in order ofthe acronym) the states addressed: 
Japan (national implementation measures), Australia (universalisation), Canada 
(accountability framework), Korea, Republic of (universalisation- a political-economy 
analysis of incentives and disincentives to BWC adherence), Switzerland (confidence 
building measures), Norway (secretariat), NZ (programme of work for the next intersessional 
process). It remains to be seen if this middle power coalition can achieve what the Ad Hoc 
group could not. Given that discussions on the protocol have been underway since the 1994 
VEREX report, the longevity of the coalition will be vital to this process. 
Nicholas Sims, as the primary authority on the JACKSNNZ group, has a number of 
recommendations on the future utility of this grouping within the BWC that are also relevant 
for this thesis. These recommendations look to the long term viability of the coalition, in 
particular to the next RevCon scheduled to take place in 2011. Sims emphases the need to for 
the coalition member state to develop specialised areas of expertise through a division of 
labour. The formal division oflabour stands out as a pragmatic and achievable objective to 
extract the greatest advantage out of current resources and capacity. This more formalised 
approach commits states to delivering on their area of expertise, increases the investment of 
each state in the coalition and is also a more efficient use of resources as it incorporates the 
individual state actions already underway. Middle power nuclear coalitions could benefit 
from this approach. The NAC in particular relied on an organic division of labour rather than 
formal positions. Such a division could build on established areas of interest and increase the 
efficiency of their initiatives. A number ofNAC states have already specialised and have 
invested individual projects such as the for example the New Zealand, Switzerland and East-
West Institute initiative on de-alerting.258 There may be a way to bring these initiatives under 
the NAC umbrella. This division oflabour could conceivably contribute to the cohesion of a 
coalition like the NAC presenting a way to work through the issues that are causing internal 
disputes. It also allows states that have particular interest (or current investment) in an issue 
area to bring this work under the NAC umbrella. This diversifies the support for the issue or 
concerns, while at the same time raising the profile of the NAC. Sims also suggests that the 
JACKSNNZ could formalise the group's structure to include the proposition of draft 
257 Ambassador M. Grinius (Canada), JACKSNNZ Opening Statement, p. 1. 
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language as a group and develop middle ground consensus around a major conference 
deliverable.259 This in fact reflects the NAC approach to the 2000 RevCon, suggesting that 
informality of the JACKSNNZ activity was not successful. Sims suggests that the structure 
and the formality of the coalition is critical to the success of the initiative. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has considered middle power coalitions in a number of operating environment 
from the fast-track Ottawa and Oslo style processes to the incremental development ofthe 
BWC. It has become clear that a dramatic shift from the NPT RevCon environment or drastic 
change to the middle power coalition may not be viable. Rather, more specific organisational 
changes and modified strategies may be more important in the context of nuclear 
disarmament. Unlike the Ottawa and Oslo Processes, the complexity of the NPT regime and 
normative environment demands that a more nuanced and subtle approach be employed by 
middle power advocates of nuclear disarmament. 
Middle powers can still adopt some (or part) of the strategies employ in the Ottawa and Oslo 
Processes. These states could mimic the fast track approach with specific or more limited 
objectives. Middle powers will be more effective when isolating and addressing a specific 
issue that can be covered by a single norm, rather than attempting to advocate for a blanket 
prohibition of nuclear weapons (where are multiple of competing norms already in place). In 
this case it would be much easier for middle power advocates to clearly frame a specific 
problem and develop a policy solution to suit, particularly ifthere is a clear casual story 
involved. A number of discrete Ottawa and Oslo-style initiatives could work in parallel for 
example initiatives could focus on de-alerting, tactical nuclear weapons, the legality of the 
use of the weapons, or an FMCT. 
There are a range of forums available to middle power advocates of nuclear disarmament. 
These states may choose to contribute to support the CD and the NPT RevCon process with 
conferences or side events such as those held by the SAL W middle power coalition. Such 
conferences could facilitate dialogue and negotiations for a policy position. These sideline 
events (or conferences) create formal or informal spaces to debate policy (reminiscent of the 
approach used by the MPI). The other option is to move outside of the traditional, consensus 
based forms and opt for an independent, fast-track treaty negotiation process similar to that 
adopted by the Ottawa and Oslo Processes. As previously mentioned such a process may do 
259 N. A. Sims, The Future of Biological Weapons Disarmament, p. 87. 
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more harm than good to multilateral nuclear disarmament. There is scope to develop a 
strategy somewhere in between including a series of conferences parallel to the traditional 
UN forums designed to facilitate dialogue on an issue of concern or negotiate an auxiliary 
agreement. 
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CHAPTER SIX: State level analysis 
This thesis is premised on the assumption that middle powers have the capacity to influence 
the nuclear decision-making of other, more powerful states by advocating for a nuclear 
disarmament norm in a coalitions comprised of 'like-minded' middle powers. This thesis also 
makes the claim that middle power states will tend towards coalition behaviour and can 
actively direct this strategy; however, middle power states will only pursue strategies they 
perceive to be available to them and this is dependent on the domestic and international 
constraints that the individual states face. This chapter addresses the disarmament diplomacy 
of four middle power states: Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Norway. While the four states 
are western, liberal-democratic, open, affluent and trade-dependent industrial sodeties,26o 
these states represent a diverse geographical and political spread. They also vary in terms of 
size, capacity and political orientation (with varying degrees of proximity to the great 
powers). These states have all adopted a principled approach to the advocacy of disarmament 
and human security norms, and share a common aspiration to present their policies as good 
international citizens.261 
This chapter considers the drivers for disarmament diplomacy in each state, the tendency 
towards cooperative behaviour, and the likelihood that these middle powers would engage in 
a middle power nuclear disarmament coalition. This chapter will also consider the foreign 
policy areas in which these states have specialised and how this influences their choice of 
diplomatic strategy. The opportunities and limitations inherent upon each of the states 
demonstrates the nuances of state involvement in norm advocacy. Within this group these 
states have followed very different paths to advocate for nuclear disarmament and 
demonstrate a wide range of advocacy strategies. 262 
The contribution of state level analysis 
State level analysis is important for three reasons. Firstly, foreign policy decision-making 
occurs at the state level and is constrained by the domestic political system, the domestic 
assessment of security priorities and the various international agreements to which the state is 
260 K. Colijn, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: a medium-power concern?" p. 349. 
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a party.263 Secondly, while the middle power coalition creates a dynamic that is greater than 
the sum of its parts, the advocacy of the coalition is ultimately dependent upon the 
contribution of the states involved. Thirdly, state foreign policy preferences and the domestic 
perception of international influences determines the diplomatic strategies adopted by these 
states. This state level analysis illustrates the impact of the following moderator variables on 
coalition advocacy: (1) The capacity of the norm entrepreneur (to exercise leadership on 
disarmament, to develop a niche area of expertise and to engage in state-NOO cooperation), 
(2) The framing of the new norm by the middle power norm entrepreneur (states will frame 
the norm such that it is consistent with their own values, reflecting the state level drivers for 
nuclear disarmament advocacy), and (3) the international environment in which these states 
operate (this environment is specific to each state, including domestic and international 
constraints). The dynamics of international politics will ultimately determine whether or not a 
middle power state engages in cooperative nuclear disarmament norm advocacy. 
Canadian middle power foreign policy 
Canada has established a reputation as a strong supporter of nuclear disarmament within the 
UN system. Canada was the first state to claim a role as a middle power,264 a role that 
entailed mediating between the Cold War adversaries, the United States and Russia. Having 
refrained from a nuclear weapons program (despite being involved in the Manhattan Project), 
Canada is reliant on multilateral institutions to guarantee security. Despite having also 
developed a reputation as an active participant in multilateral forums, engaging in diplomatic 
activism on selected human security (second and third agenda) items,265 Canada's nuclear 
disarmament advocacy is much more restrained. It appears unlikely that Canada would 
engage in a middle power coalition on nuclear disarmament. 
The Canadian 'human security agenda' 
Canada was instrumental in the development ofthe human security agenda. 266 Canadian 
diplomacy on this issue peaked in the 1990s with the 'Axworthy Doctrine' under the 
direction of former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. This doctrine articulated the link 
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between nuclear disarmament, conventional weapons disarmament and the human security 
agenda.267 The Canadian human security agenda involved the 1998 Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCF AIT) report, Canada and the Nuclear 
Challenge: Reducing the Political Value o/Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty First Century, 
the Ottawa Process on Landmines and the Canada-Norway Partnership for Action: Lysoen 
Declaration of 1998.268 During this period Canada's preference for traditional multilateral 
engagement gave way to a more activist variant, and involved new diplomatic strategies such 
'public,' 'fast-track,' and 'just in time' diplomacy.269 It was these strategies that contributed 
to the success of the Ottawa Process.270 While Canada came late to the ICBL, it superseded 
the efforts of other nations to assume a leadership role. Through this leadership on the human 
security agenda Canada was able to demonstrate an independent foreign policy, without 
jeopardising its relationship with the great powers (in particular the United States). 
Canadian nuclear disarmament diplomacy 
Canada's articulation of the lillie between human security and nuclear disarmament was 
unique as it was the first time that this connection had been made at a state level; however, 
Canada was unsuccessful in this attempt to reframe the nuclear disarmament debate as this 
effort failed to gain the public profile that the Ottawa Process received.271 The Canadian 
Parliamentary Report published in 1998 recommended that Canada take a lead role to reduce 
the political value of nuclear weapons through the legislative process. 272 This report failed to 
influence Canadian foreign policy, as the Canadian government attempted to downplay 
human security aspects of nuclear disarmament, mindful of United States reluctance to 
engage on the issue. 273 As a result, Canadian disarmament diplomacy has developed an 
uneven character.274 On one hand, Canada has demonstrated considerable will and capacity to 
267 T.S. Hataley and K. Nossal, "The Limits of the Human Security Agenda: The Case of Canada's Response to 
the Timor Crisis," Global Change, Peace & Security, 16, 1, (February 2004), p. 9. 
268 The Lysoen Declaration was in essence and action plan on human security. R. M. Behringer, "Middle Power 
Leadership on the Human Security Agenda." p. 305. 
269 A. F. Cooper "The evolution of Multilateralism in an Intermediate State: The reorientation of Canadian 
Strategy in the Economic and Security Arenas," p. 2. 
270 As discussed in Chapter 4. See for example p. 51. 
271 Rideau Institute, Restoring Canada's Disarmament Policies, Expert Seminar, Ottawa, (February 3-4, 2008), 
<http://www.rideauinstitute.ca/file-Iibrary/disarmament-seminar.pdf> see also in M. Hanson, "The Advocacy 
States: Their Normative Role Before and After the U.S. calls for Nuclear Zero." 
272 M. Hanson, "Advancing Disarmament in the Face of Great Power Reluctance: The Canadian Contribution," 
Working Paper no. 37, The Liu Institute ofIntemational Relations, University of British Columbia, (2001). 
273 D. Roche, "Stuck in the Middle? Canada's Record and Role in Promoting Disarmament," Disarmament 
Dftlomacy , 53 (December 2000), retrieved February 16, 2007 from <www.acronym.org.uk!53roche.htm>. 
27 A. F. Cooper, "The evolution of Multilateralism in an Intermediate State: The Reorientation of Canadian 
Strategy in the Economic and Security Arenas," p. 4. 
67 
upgrade its multilateral activity in selected areas of the international agenda where there is 
scope and space for this activity (the Ottawa Process);27S however, there has been little room 
for Canada to move on the nuclear issue (particularly in the last decade). Canada's working 
papers on NPT institutional capacity have not been widely received. In addition, Canada has 
an inconsistent UNGA voting pattern, which again, has largely been due to the relationship 
with the United States. 
The influence of the international environment 
Canada has sought to playa role in the space around the great powers; however, external 
constraints have played a large role in Canada's nuclear disarmament diplomacy.276 
. Canada's involvement in the formation ofthe NPT demonstrates the constraints of great 
power dominance. Along with other middle powers, Brazil, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and 
Sweden, Canada played an important, but ultimately peripheral role in the drafting of the 
Treaty.277 Canada adopted an important technical and legal role and was able to alter the 
substantive text, but not able to incorporate stronger compliance and enforcement measures 
into the draft. 278 Because "the arms control process was a sub-set of the central political 
relationship between the two superpowers, it was conducted primarily as a dialogue between 
Moscow and Washington. As such, the middle powers were excluded from the main 
negotiating table. ,,279 This set clear perimeters for Canadian nuclear disarmament diplomacy, 
which has remained primarily concerned with technical or practical issues ever since. While 
supporting disarmament in principle, Canada's advocacy has focused on scientific and 
technical cooperation, and institutional development. 280 An example of this sort of 
organisational-level initiative includes Canada's role in the NPT Review and Extension 
Conference. Canada generated further support for the NPTs indefinite extension by collecting 
signature to demonstrate that such a vote would be successful. 281 While Canada is supportive 
of disarmament and a balanced or progressive approach the non-proliferation regime 
obligations, Canada has refrained from direct advocacy of the disarmament issue. 
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The potential for Canadian engagement in a middle power nuclear disarmament coalition 
Canada's multilateral approach extends to membership of the many nuclear agreements and 
has historically included strong support in the initial stages of multilateral arms control 
initiatives. Canada has invested diplomatic resources into negotiations leading to the creation 
of new regimes. 282 Nonetheless, Canada has not committed to a middle power coalition in 
this field. Canada was approached by the NAC shortly before the 1999 UNGA. Canada 
declinedjoin the NAC, but was supportive of the NAC objectives as they reflected steps 
already taken to combat a "new nuclear real politic being used by proliferators in Nuclear 
weapons states to justify the proliferation or retention of nuclear weapons.,,283 Canada's 
decision to abstain from the 1999 NAC-sponsored UNGA resolution vote, due to NATO 
membership, was accompanied by a commitment to engage in further discussions. 284 The 
human security agenda still informs Canadian public policy, but the need establish 
independent views has become less of a priority, while a close relationship to the United 
States has increasingly become a priority.285 In this context it is unlikely that Canada will 
adopt more maximalist policy on nuclear disarmament without a sustained and clear shift in 
the policies of the United States. 
Japanese middle power foreign policy 
Japanese nuclear disarmament advocacy is characterised by moral leadership and pragmatic 
diplomacy; however, Japan has also engaged in nuclear-hedging under the umbrella of the 
United States extended nuclear deterrence. Japan has contributed to non-proliferation norms 
and has supported a number of disarmament-related, nuclear security initiatives such as the 
CTBT and FMCT negotiations; however, as an advocate of disarmament, Japan has preferred 
to maintain independence from other disarmament advocates and initiatives. Japanese 
disarmament diplomacy has at times been pessimistically labelled 'karaoke diplomacy, ,286 in 
reference to the dominance of Japan's relationship with the United States and concerns over 
regional security to in preference to progress on disarmament. State sponsored initiatives 
such as the recent ICNND (a cooperative effort with the Australian government) suggest that 
Japan may consider a more cooperative approach to nuclear disarmament advocacy. 
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Nevertheless, Japan is also unlikely to engage in a middle power nuclear disarmament 
coalition activity. 
Japan's unique relationship to nuclear weapons 
Japan is in a unique position as a nuclear disarmament advocate. With a pacifist constitution 
and defence oriented security policy it is heavily reliant on the security of the United States-
Japan alliance and extended nuclear deterrence. While the three non-nuclear principles form 
the bedrock of Japan's nuclear policy (and these are deeply embedded cultural and political 
norms), Japan has also invested heavily in a highly developed nuclear energy industry.287 
This dual track policy of 'nuclear denial' and 'nuclear approval ,288 in effect provides Japan 
with a latent nuclear status.289 It is this "threshold status,,290 that positions Japan as uniquely. 
situated to act as a leader and entrepreneur in the field of nuclear weapons disarmament 
having rejected weapons acquisition as not essential for security;291 however, these policies 
of nuclear hedging inhibit as well as empower their disarmament advocacy. Nuclear hedging 
decreases the legitimacy of Japanese calls for disarmament (when it is unwilling to 'come 
from under the umbrella' of United States extended deterrence?92 
Japanese nuclear disarmament diplomacy 
As the only state to have experienced a nuclear attack, Japan has a broad domestic anti-
nuclear consensus and an active, internationalist orientated NOO community focusing 
predominantly on maximalist disarmament strategies. This is at odds with the incremental 
methods favoured by the Japanese government towards nuclear disarmament. As a result, 
there is a clear delineation between the Japanese NOO community and government policy 
making;293 the Japanese government's sponsorship of the ICNND suggests that the gap 
between the NGO community and government policy may be is closing. 
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In response to domestic pressures Japan sponsors an annual UNGA resolution 'A Path to the 
Total Elimination a/Nuclear Weapons J and in 2001 Japan proposed 24 concrete steps 
towards this objective. 294Again in 2009, Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone 
outlined 11 disarmament priorities in a speech titled "Conditions towards Zero- 11 
Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament. ,,295 This was followed by a draft resolution 
submitted to the UNGA on nuclear disarmament titled 'Renewed determination towards the 
total elimination a/nuclear weapons.' 296 These resolutions are routinely adopted by a 
majority of states, including the United States in 2009; however, this support from the United 
States was the result of the Obama Administrations policies on nuclear disarmament rather 
than Japanese influence. These initiatives like the NAC resolutions measure international 
support and aggregate attention, but do little to develop the norm of nuclear disarmament. 
Despite Japans investment in the ICNND it appears reluctant to assume a more active role as 
a norm disarmament norm advocate. 
Japanese nuclear (non-proliferation) diplomacy 
Beyond these broad principles (or action points), the Japan has emphasised the need for 
practical and realistic approach to the non-proliferation challenges investing diplomatic and 
economic resources in a number of specific projects. Japan has placed great importance on 
and has been a 'strong if not leading advocate of the CTBT, ,297 on the early entry into force 
of the CTBT and universalisation of the CTBT. 298 Japan has also given great support to the 
FMCT negotiations, emphasizing the importance and urgency of the commencement of 
FMCT.299 In line with a balanced approach, Japan has also been involved in the promotion of 
the Additional Protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements, which support nuclear security and 
ultimately create a secure environment for disarmament. 300 Japan's diplomatic actions are 
characterised by economic and technical diplomacy, including support for assistance and 
sanctions. Japan has provided economic assistance to Russia's denuclearisation efforts. 301 
Japan also provided economic and technical assistance to support the Central Asian Nuclear 
294 Y. Amano, "A Japanese view on nuclear disarmament," p. 143. 
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Weapons Free Zone in 1999. Additionally, Japan froze economic assistance to India and 
Pakistan after the tests in 1998 and offered 'a very privileged relationship' and increased 
economic cooperation with Pakistan ifit would sign the CTBT. 302 Maria Rost Rublee 
suggests that technical assistance includes creating space for dialogue in and around the 
traditional forums. 303As such Japan established the Tokyo Forum, to facilitate dialogue on 
the South Asian crisis. 
These pragmatic diplomatic strategies are in part the result of Japan's sensitivities to the 
United States alliance and concerns regarding nuclear disarmament measures that may 
decrease security and stability in the Asia- Pacific region.304 Japan has a number of valid 
regional security concerns including nuclear proliferation, non-compliance and ballistic 
missile testing in North Korea, the assertive postures of both China and Russia (both nuclear 
weapon states), 305 and the risk of terrorist attack at sensitive sites from both internal and 
external threats.306 As such Japanese disarmament diplomacy has largely been constrained by 
more pressing security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region.307 
Japanese engagement in a middle power coalition 
The Japanese preference for unilateral disarmament advocacy, economic diplomacy and its 
reliance on the United States extended nuclear deterrence has put the Japanese position at 
odds with other pro-disarmament advocates. Moreover, Japan views many of the nuclear 
disarmament initiatives to be unrealistic and undermine security.308 Japan had been asked, 
and had refused to join the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) preferring to take an approach that 
was more "palatable to the NWS, while also assuaging domestic opinion calling for a strong 
Japanese stance against nuclear weapons.,,309 While Japan's efforts though the ICNND 
suggests an increasing domestic consensus and increased investment in disarmament 
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advocacy, given Japan's history of cautious disarmament diplomacy, it seems unlikely that 
Japan would engage in a middle power coalition. 
New Zealand's middle power foreign policy 
As a small, geographically isolated state, New Zealand's absence ofpower, political and 
economic weight and relative strategic invisibility ensure that this country operates "for the 
most part below the radar of powerful nations.,,31o It is this limitation in international 
relations that paradoxically provide the source of advocacy potential. This relative isolation 
has enabled New Zealand to pursue an independent foreign policy and this anonymity has 
necessitated a more resourceful, concentrated and pragmatic diplomatic corp. 311 As an 
advocate of nuclear disarmament, New Zealand carries political and moral credibility on anti-
nuclear issues, but given its small size and absence of strategic credibility, it lacks authority 
on the disarmament issue. Where New Zealand anti-nuclear advocacy had previously focus 
on domestic and regional concerns, engagement in the NAC provided the New Zealand 
government with provided the vehicle to advocate for disarmament outside the Pacific 
. 312 
regIOn. 
New Zealand is not traditionally associated with the middle power model; however, reference 
to its small size fails to explain New Zealand's foreign policy aspirations to advance the 
nuclear disarmament agenda internationally. As a small state, with an albeit large presence in 
the Pacific, New Zealand is reliant on a stable and secure international environment within 
which to pursue its national interest and that of its dependents. New Zealand's relative 
isolation has enabled a reappraisal of contemporary security threats, with a focus on "bio-
security and stewardship of the marine environment.,,313 
New Zealand's anti- nuclear advocacy 
The NAC provided New Zealand with a vehicle to exert an influence as an international 
nuclear disarmament advocate. Prior to New Zealand's engagement in the NAC, New 
Zealand's anti-nuclear diplomacy was primarily focused on national and regional concerns. 
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As a norm entrepreneur and NNWS, New Zealand's nuclear policies are shaped largely by 
the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act, of 1987. This 
legislation has its origins in a broad, domestic grassroots, civil society and nongovernmental 
movement and remains virtually entrenched with bipartisan support.314 This legislation had a 
negative impact on New Zealand's relationship with the United States. It resulted in the 
suspension of the operation of the ANZUS treaty (with respect to NZ) and the cessation of 
military and intelligence ties. While 'there has been a degree of moderation of some of these 
measures over the intervening period' however it is this status as a friend which continues to 
define NZ's relationship with the United States.315 This legislation provides New Zealand 
with some weight on non-nuclear norms; however, it has not influenced the nuclear policies 
of other states. 
New Zealand's international influence in this area has been through the promotion of 
NWFZs, in particular that 1986 Rarotonga Treaty and South Pacific NWFZ. There are three 
protocols to the treaty, which have been signed by the five declared nuclear weapons states, 
while not all ofthe protocols have been ratified this Treaty substantially limits and prohibits 
the manufacture, stationing or testing within the Zone. New Zealand remains a supporter of a 
Southern Hemisphere NWFZ. 316 These regional initiatives contribute to the anti-nuclear 
norm, complement disarmament initiatives and influence the nuclear policies of the NWS 
(through the protocols to the treaties); however, they have not contributed to advancing 
nuclear disarmament. 
New Zealand's recourse to international legal proceedings also carries normative and legal 
weight, and has the capacity to influence the great powers. The nuclear tests cases at the 
International Court of Justice addressed French atmospheric testing (1974) and underground 
testing (1995) in the South Pacific. 317 The 1974 case ended in dispute, but led to the French 
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announcement that it would cease atmospheric testing as the case was pending.318 In the 
context of the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Use or the Threat of Use of 
Nuclear Weapons 319 New Zealand took an early position, as one of the only two Western 
Aligned Nations to Vote in favour of the 1994 UNGA resolution.32o New Zealand has 
subsequently cited the Advisory Opinion as "confirmation of the NWS' obligation to 
eliminate these weapons and the legitimation of the nuclear disarmament norm." 321 New 
Zealand referred to this Opinion in its ratification statement to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), making an 'interpretative declaration' that the indiscriminate nature of nuclear 
weapons meant that their use would constitute a war crime and therefore fall under the 
jurisdiction if the ICC.322 
New Zealand in the New Agenda Coalition 
New Zealand's main contribution to the 2000 Review Conference came via its work through 
the NAC and in particular through the influence of Disarmament Ambassador Clive Pearson, 
chair of the Subsidiary Body 1 to the Main Committee I (MCl) "tasked with Negotiating 
nuclear disarmament language for the final draft.,,323 This "finely balanced" l7-paragraph 
draft "drew heavily from the NAC working paper on nuclear disarmament, became the 
operational document for further negotiation on a forward look," this was particularly 
important as the Main Committee I's report on a backward look remained mired in 
disagreement. 324 Despite the continued presence of the NAC, efforts to advance the agenda 
were undermined by the disastrous 2005 Review Conference outcome. As such New 
Zealand's nuclear diplomacy has been relegated to supporting positions and efforts to 
reengage the consensus from 2000. 
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As a small state with even less diplomatic resources than the other middle powers in chapter, 
conservation of diplomatic energy and strategic positioning become more of a priority. 
Diplomatic position and skills need to be developed and resourced. 325 New Zealand is a 
consistent and often vocal advocate for the role of international institutions, conference 
diplomacy, fair negotiations, and equality between states. 326 As a result New Zealand often 
favours the middle power advocacy model, with broad geographic membership on issues of 
interest, seeking these multilateral coalitions across a wide range of issues including-
disarmament, environment, humanitarian intervention, agricultural protectionism, human 
rights and law of the sea, keeping different company on each of these issues. 327 Consequently 
New Zealand is well placed to take strong, principled position on nuclear disarmament but is 
limited by the consequences of its previous endeavours. This history of principled advocacy 
NZ is considered by many to more 'extreme' than practical and is at odds with many 
disarmament advocates that prefer to maintain positive diplomatic relations with United 
States, consequently this has limited the opportunity for New Zealand to engage in coalitions 
with other middle powers. 
New Zealand is likely to invest in future disarmament coalitions, primarily to maintain the 
reputation as disarmament advocate; however, New Zealand has continued to engage at an 
international level on many disarmament issues, despite the relative failure of the NAC. 328 
Norwegian middle power foreign policy 
Norway has emerged as a vocal and active advocate for nuclear disarmament. Norwegian 
engagement on the nuclear issue originated from security concerns regarding Russia's 
nuclear program and activities in the Arctic Circle, these nuclear security and environmental 
concerns prompted the early technical focus Norwegian anti-nuclear efforts during the Cold 
War. Norway has traditionally maintained an independent and relatively neutral foreign 
policy and kept a reasonably low profile during this time. Current Norwegian nuclear 
disarmament diplomacy however, can be attributed to the emergence of Norway as a 
specialist in the field of conflict mediation. Couple with early support for the human security 
agenda (and the Lysoen Declaration) and the skilled mediation that Norway demonstrated in 
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the Oslo accords has been positively reinforced through subsequent invitations to mediate 
other conflicts by Norway's involvement the Ottawa and Oslo Processes. As such, Norway's 
current position on nuclear disarmament has developed out of the increasingly public profile 
that Norway has developed as an archetypical 'good international citizen.' This engagement 
is has been possible because of Norway's small, highly skilled and activist foreign ministry 
and close relationships with the NGO community. The nuclear disarmament issue has 
emerged as a natural fit with the knowledge, resources and networks accumulated through 
Norway's human security orientated activity. Norwegian diplomacy is characterised by a 
"judicious blending of the resources of government and the "field experience" garnered at the 
grassroots level by their NGOs. The close relationship between Norwegian NGOs and the 
Norwegian government has produced both detailed knowledge and essential channels at 
many different levels for trust and consensus building.,,329 
Norwegian nuclear diplomacy 
Elements Norwegian conflict mediation diplomacy (which has typically been behind the 
scenes, in 'closed- door negotiations') can be seen in Norway's nuclear disarmament 
advocacy which has historically tended to be out of the public eye. As the 'expert-mediator,' 
Norway supported the NAC-NWS negotiations at the 2000 NPT RevCon. This closed-door 
diplomacy is a very different style to that employed in the Ottawa and Oslo Processes, which 
involved public diplomacy hosting of conferences Norway hosted the September 1997 
'Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-personnel Landmines' in 
Oslo, which adopted the Convention.33o As such Norway appears to be as comfortable 
behind the scenes as it is in public leadership positions. As a result of this previous 
experience there are number of option available to Norway, and has prompted the Norwegian 
government to seek to draw together the consultative, behind the scenes mediation with the 
public approach in the field of nuclear disarmament diplomacy. 
Evolving the coalition approach 
Current Norwegian initiatives emphasise the role of middle power coalition activity including 
the 7NI discussed previously in Chapter Four discussed. The 7NI has moved beyond the 
strictly defined advocacy coalition to include cooperative initiatives with NGOs and NWS 
(the United Kingdom). In addition, Norway has publically voiced an intention to investigate 
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the possibility of take the FMCT outside ofthe CD calling upon Norwegian experience in the 
Ottawa and Oslo Processes. Negotiating an FMCT outside of the CD would require an 
extensive coalition of states to support his move, but would allow the states to focus on areas 
of agreement, rather having he process remain a hostage to consensus. In a statement to the 
CD, Hilde Skorpen, Deputy Permanent Representative Norway, stated that 
"Norway recognises that there are some crucial differences between the nuclear 
disarmament agenda and the agenda that led to the ban on landmines and cluster 
munitions. But there are also similarities. Disarmament is a tool to enhance 
international, national and human security, for states and for people independent of 
the agenda or bodies in which we decide to interact.,,33! 
This statement comes very close to the direction of the discussion this thesis, particularly the 
concluding analysis in Chapter Four. It would appear that the Norwegian foreign ministry 
proposes that a consensus on the issues is not needed to extend a normative prohibition to 
states not part to the agreement. 
Conclusions: 
Despite being western and ostensibly pro-disarmament, this brief analysis of the nuclear 
polices of these four states reveals that there is a wide variety of approaches favoured. These 
states invested in niche roles that reflect their geographic and political positions. This 
specialisation has enabled these Canada and Japan to exert an influence on issues without 
compromising their relationship with the United States. While, all ofthese states have 
engaged in disarmament advocacy as individual states, Canada and Japan demonstrate a 
preference for this unilateral approach as it draws less attention from the NWS. These states 
are unlikely to engage in middle power coalitions because ofthe dominance of their 
relationships to the great powers in their regions. The nuclear disarmament diplomacy of 
these states appears to be more static, in that they repeatedly used the same platform. For 
example the Japanese UNGA resolution or Canada's working papers in the RevCon cycle. 
For various reasons (including great power pressure, domestic politics and pressing security 
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concerns) these states have not committed to moving their positions on nuclear disarmament 
forward. 
In comparison, New Zealand and Norway view disarmament advocacy vehicle to claim a 
greater international presence. These states have developed reasonably independent foreign 
policies and are subsequently less constrained in the choice of strategy. Moreover, the 
foreign policies that these states pursue have been reinforced either from domestic support or 
international recognition. Where there is no positive feedback or the policies find resistance 
these middle powers have been very quick to change track. The anti-nuclear or disarmament 
advocacy of these states demonstrates a progression of increasingly sophisticated actions. 
New Zealand established a reputation as a principled actor as has moved from a primarily 
domestic and regional focus, to utilise a number of forums to advocate for the anti-nuclear 
position (including the ICJ, NWFZ and the NAC) and New Zealand has invest in developing 
expertise at an intemationallevel, or supporting international level initiatives. Norway has 
demonstrated a similar progression taking the technical competence on nuclear security 
issues and experience gained in conflict mediation and human security initiatives, translating 
this dynamic into the nuclear disarmament context. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
This chapter will draw together the conclusions from this research to outline a series of 
recommendations that can be applied to future middle power nuclear disarmament coalitions. 
As a starting point, Chapter Three identified the factors that determined the NAC influence 
on NWS decision-making at the 2000 RevCon. As John Simpson has suggested, the main 
contribution of the NAC was the structural and organisational approach taken.332 Chapter 
Three also identified the reasons why the influence of the NAC was ultimately limited. This 
coalition failed to: (1) define specific objectives, policies or deliverables at the outset, (2) 
maintain momentum, (3) implement progress (based on commitments and agreement 
undertaken), (4) maintain internal cohesion within the coalition, (5) guarantee the longevity 
of the coalition to ensure a consistent presence, (6) frame both the issues and the solutions 
with due regard to the operating environment. The 'coalition' hypothesis of this thesis has 
been supported by the fact that middle power states have used the coalition platform to 
generate momentum on a broad spectrum of disarmament initiatives, contributing to nuclear, 
chemical, biological, and conventional weapons disarmament with varying degree of success. 
These coalitions demonstrated a broad range of strategies available to middle power states 
that employ the coalition approach. This chapter will address a number of these strategies that 
could be used to remedy the shortcomings identified in the NAC example. 
The template of moderator variables: analysing diplomatic strategies 
This research was framed by a template of moderator variables which determined the 
relationship between the coalition approach and the success of the middle power states as 
norm entrepreneurs. These moderator variables are also useful as framework to categorise 
potential coalition strategies. 
1) The capacity of the norm entrepreneurs to demonstrate leadership 
The capacity of the norm entrepreneurs to demonstrate leadership is largely reliant on the 
structure and the membership of the coalition. This research has covered a full spectrum of 
middle power cooperative activity from state-led coalitions to state-sponsored international 
commissions and transnational advocacy networks; however, a number of the cases involved 
a combination of strategies including partnerships between middle powers, NGOs and NWS 
(such as the United Kingdom). The possible coalition structures identified in the preceding 
332 J. Simpson, "Nuclear Anns Control: Appendix 6B. The 2000 NPT Review Conference," p. 488. 
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research includes: (1) a fonnalised core group of middle power states, (2) a flexible or ad hoc 
membership arrangement, (3) a break-out group or subgroups to focus on particular areas of 
concern, (4) the clear division labour amongst member of the coalition, (5) consultation or 
liaison arrangements with other like-minded middle powers, NGOs or NWS or (6) 
partnerships with NWS or transnational advocacy networks. 
Closely related to the organisational structure of the coalition is the choice of the coalition 
operating environment. Again there is a variety of operational level strategies available 
including: (1) conference diplomacy in the UN sponsored forums such as the RevCon 
Process or the CD, (2) a series of conferences designed to support the operation of the 
traditional forums, (3) a fast-track, goal-orientated Ottawa and Oslo-style Process, (4) 
independent initiatives that focus on technical or conceptual issues, or (4) a strategy that 
appropriates the successful elements of the previous examples. 
2) The constraints of the international environment 
The success of middle power coalition advocacy is dependent on the complex interplay 
between the operating environments, dominant nonns, coalition strategies and the domestic 
situations of the states themselves. In a hostile international environment, middle power 
advocacy is severely curtailed. The middle power coalitions investigated in the preceding 
chapters have demonstrated some capacity to tailor their advocacy to mitigate the 
constraining influence of the international system. Even in hostile conditions, many of these 
initiatives took steps to create an environment that will support the implementation of 
disarmament, at the very least create space for negotiations or identify the middle ground.333 
The capacity of the coalition to mitigate constraints is largely dependent on the accurate 
assessment of the international situation (complementary and competing norms, and the 
security priorities of the states involved). Most importantly, these coalitions are successful 
where the states have assessed that coalition could reasonably assert an influence as the 
coalition is ultimately dependent on a receptive international environment. As discussed in 
Chapter Four, pragmatic middle power advocacy will take these limitations into account and 
work around them rather than against them. In particular, middle power states have 
complemented their diplomacy by developing partnerships with NGOs, facilitating dialogue 
or working on the technical aspects of disannament that impede progress. 
333 S. Kongstad, "Seminar: A Nordic Initiative for Nuclear Abolition," p.4. 
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3) The characteristics of the issue. 
In each case study, the effectiveness of the coalition advocacy has been determined by the 
degree to which the middle power advocates have addressed the specific characteristics 
unique to the disarmament issue. This involves identifying and framing the problem and 
developing clear policy solutions to match this demand. Where the characteristics (such as 
the utility of the weapon, the replacement value, the norms that guide behaviour regime, the 
institutions already in place and characteristics of possession and use) are complicated, 
disputed or unclear, the middle power coalition's influence has been limited. Each weapons 
category is subject to very different characteristics; however, the approach to determining 
strategy that is most appropriate is same. Middle power coalition would benefit from 
addressing specific issue areas that can be addressed by a single, uniformly applicable norm. 
Again, these states must be mindful oflimitations and strategise accordingly. 
4) The framing the issue and the development of the case for disarmament by norm 
entrepreneurs. 
As the case studies demonstrate, middle power coalitions have an advantage where they can 
frame the debate, the issue and develop a strong case for disarmament by producing a viable 
policy solution. There are a number of ways to develop or isolate an appropriate policy 
solution. In particular, the middle power states which drew on precedent or created a package 
of policies within in a framework tended to be more effective. In reality however, a number 
of middle power coalitions (the 7NI, JACKSNNZ and the SALW examples) focused on 
activities that would precede norm advocacy such as preparing a positive environment for 
negotiations or policy formation rather than directing policy from the outset (such as in the 
case of the NAC, NATO-5, Ottawa and Oslo processes). In either situation the organised 
coalition has proved to be a useful vehicle to raise the visibility of the issue, in some cases 
putting the issue of disarmament on the international agenda. 
The selection of the most optimal coalition strategy is dependent on the objectives of the 
coalition (to achieve longevity, develop momentum, capture international interest, provide a 
forum for negotiations, promote a specific policy, the middle ground or advocate for broad 
principles). While there are a range of options available to middle power states, some 
strategies are more suited to particular objectives than others. The capacity of the middle 
power states to remain flexible and to 'pick and choose' a strategy that best suits the context 
is paramount. Similarly, the coalition's capacity to retain control over the direction of the 
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coalition initiative and to define the role, policy positions and objectives is also important. As 
Ronald Behringer has suggested, given the right combination of strategies, middle power 
coalitions may be able to overcome the domestic and international challenges decrease great 
power opposition to the advocacy issue.334 
Future middle power coalitions 
Given the relative success of the Ottawa and Oslo Processes, some NGO and state actors 
have raised the idea of a similar effort in the nuclear field. As discussed in Chapter Six, 
Norway in particular, is considering the possibility of a similar approach to conclude 
negotiations an FMCT outside of the CD.335 This thesis has considered the question of 
whether future middle power nuclear disarmament coalition activity is feasible and desirable. 
In the absence of viable policies, international consensus on long term strategy, and the 
political and strategic conditions that would enable disarmament to succeed, this is a 
conversation that is worth having. Future middle power advocates of nuclear disarmament 
must be mindful however, as developing momentum on nuclear disarmament and 
transforming political will into concrete outcomes is an onerous task. Progress towards this 
objective involves reducing both the level of armaments and reliance on these weapons in 
security policies. Influence on these issues has been beyond the scope of the middle power 
states. Instead, as the NWS have argued it is just as necessary to implement the conditions 
that would enable such reductions to have a positive impact on international security. While 
this may not include the direct advocacy of the nuclear disarmament norm, this is an area 
where middle power could make a contribution. 
The recommendations: a/ull spectrum o/potentialmiddle power action. 
The following recommendations suggest a range, or spectrum of possible options applicable 
for future middle power activity in the context of current nuclear disarmament dynamics 
derived from the previous examples. In ascending order of complexity, the recommendations 
are as follows: 
1) An informal or ad hoc effort 
Similar to the NATO-5 effort, an informal coalition of middle powers could focus on a 
specific issue, to generate short term momentum. An ad hoc coalition of this kind would 
334 R. M. Behringer, "Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda," p. 305. 
335 In particular the Norwegian Foreign Ministry is considering this issue. H. Skorpen, Statement to the CD. 
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operate on the periphery of a traditional forum (for example the CD or a RevCon) to take 
advantage of an opportunity when it arises. This sort of activity could provide a much needed 
'boost' to put an issue in the agenda or resolve end-stage negotiations. There are a number of 
substantive and procedural issues that require a catalyst to gain momentum. Middle power 
states could identify anyone of these; however, preferable one in which they have a vested 
interest and authority. Possible issues could include NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, the 
tactical nuclear weapons issue, or CTBT ratifications. 
2) An informal coalition that aims to conclude a consensus agreement on a middle 
ground issue 
This approach would be similar in style to the NAC between 1998 and 2000. This 'initiative 
would involve some policy development and but would focus on the skill of the member state 
at conference diplomacy. The middle power states would be better placed if the coalition 
could identify the middle ground ahead of time and engage in preparatory diplomacy in the 
lead up to the formal negotiations. An initiative like this would be useful in the context of the 
2010 RevCon as 'coalitions of consent' are particularly when concluding a successful 
outcome. 336 Given the high expectation held by many states parties that this 2010 will be a 
success, there is a keen need to focus on areas of agreement, rather than the areas of 
difference.337 An informal coalition of this type would better to address a few specific issues 
of concern and adopt a flexible position on these issues so as to avoid the damaging 
consequences of internal divisions. This coalition could benefit from a partnership with a 
transnational network to reduce the resource investment; however, such a coalition may be 
better suited to performing a more functional role (such as conference diplomacy and 
negotiations) rather than advocate for a policy position. 
3) Formalised coalition that aims to create an environment that will support further 
advocacy (an 'enabling international environment,338) 
336 J. Duncan, UK Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament, Interview from the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation and the 2010 Review Conference at Wilton Park, (Monday 14 - Friday 18, December 2009), 
retrieved January 12, 2010 from 
<http://www.wiltonpark.org.uklhighlights/viewstory.aspx?ur1=/wp_129080307681656250.htm1>. 
337 S. Burke, US Special Representative for Non Proliferation, Interview from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
the 2010 Review Conference at Wilton Park, (December 14-18, 2009) retrieved December 20,2009 from 
<http://www.wiltonpark.org.uklhighlights/viewstory.aspx?ur1=/wp_129080307681656250.htm1> . 
338 S. Kongstad, "Seminar: A Nordic Initiative for Nuclear Abolition," p. 4. 
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This effort aims for the long term approach, more along the lines of the 7NI or JACKSNNZ 
efforts. These efforts aim to create an 'enabling environment,339 will prepare the ground for 
states that possess nuclear weapons to implement disarmament measures. This involves the 
formal coalition address the verification, legal and political conditions required for future 
disarmament efforts to succeed. Middle power states could articulate and demonstrate the 
feasibility of the phased reduction of nuclear weapons, through investing in cooperative 
activities such as the United Kingdom-Norway-VERTIC verification initiative. Middle 
powers can identify and demonstrate new strategies or policy options to 'lead by example.' 
This coalition may benefit from the formal division oflabour, allowing state to pursue 
individual project under the umbrella of the coalition. Such efforts could focus on 
strengthening the RevCon process or other non-proliferation regime agreements. This 
coalition should refrain from advocating for broad norms, in favour of promoting technical 
policy solutions. 
4) A formal coalition that operates outside the traditional forums to advocate for a 
specific issue or cluster of issues, similar to a limited Ottawa/ Oslo Style Process 
A middle power coalition could focus an advocacy campaign on a specific disarmament 
related issue, an element of an international agreement, or new agreement to support the 
RevCon process or the CD. This focus would be on an incremental objective that could be the 
subject of a single, uniform norm. The advocacy coalition would need to identify the policy 
solution at the outset. This coalition would need to involve core group of committed states, 
and develop partnerships with the NGO community and other supportive states. This 
approach is a step further than the coalition activity described in option (2) above because it 
involves a more formalised campaign. This campaign could take place within the existing 
institutional framework. Alternatively, this campaign could operate like the Ottawa and Oslo 
processes and convene a series of conferences, however such a campaign would benefit from 
operating parallel to the traditional forums so that the outcomes or momentum generated 
could be translated across. This process could begin by focusing on facilitating dialogue (like 
the SAL W coalition conferences) and evolve into an Ottawa/ Oslo style process further down 
the track (if supportive conditions exist). 
Adopting an Ottawa! Oslo-style process would require the development of a formal 
relationship with a transnational advocacy network and would benefit from formal 
339 Ibid. 
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relationships with other states including the great powers. This approach could be adopted to 
cement progress on an immediate step, group of steps, or a plan of action for the next review 
cycle. Moreover, a limited Ottawa/ Oslo style process could develop an auxiliary agreement 
to address any number discrete issues. The Norwegian suggestion regarding the FMCT 
negotiations would fit into this approach. In addition, this style of coalition could advocate 
for a short treaty to address the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapon. This would 
effectively introduce a ban on the use ofthe weapons, (rather than a comprehensive 
disarmament treaty) and would not require additional verification capabilities or disarmament 
efforts on the part of the NWS. Instead this would create a normative prohibition against the 
weapons use, clarify the ambiguous language in the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion and provide a 
starting point for the future process to dismantle the nuclear weapons themselves. As a part of 
the ratification process for this agreement, state signatories could include declare as part of 
national legislation, that the use of nuclear weapons would be treated as a crime against 
humanity. 340 
Ottawa/Oslo style process could also be useful to introduce an amendment to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court to extend the definition of 'crimes against 
humanity' to include the use of a nuclear weapon.341 This would require an orchestrated 
advocacy campaign centred on the Review Conference of the Rome Statute, scheduled to be 
held in Kampala, Uganda in 2010 or in a subsequent Review. This option, does not guarantee 
the extension of the prohibition to states that are not signatories (to the Rome Statute). But it 
again it could provide a useful starting point for disarmament negotiations, and may influence 
outlying states. 342 Such efforts, which rely on agreement rather than consensus may not 
substantially alter the status quo; however, it would raise the profile ofthe disarmament issue 
and contribute (at least in a normative sense) to delegitimizing and devaluing the weapons. 
Such initiatives could prepare the ground for a change in NWS nuclear postures. 
5) An Ottawa/Oslo style process to conclude a nuclear disarmament convention. 
At the end of the spectrum of possible middle power coalition activity, these states could 
launch an Ottawa/Oslo style process to conclude a nuclear disarmament convention. This is 
an option that has already been discounted in this thesis (see discussion in chapter five). The 
340 R. Johnson, "Security Assurances for Everyone: A New Approach to Deterring the Use of Nuclear 
Weapons," Disarmament Diplomacy 90 (Spring, 2009), p.7. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Ibid. 
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negotiation is seen by many to be the only option to fulfil the requirements of Article VI of 
the NPT. Indeed as the NAC declared in 1998 the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear 
weapons free world would require" ... the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally 
negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing 
set of instruments. ,,343 More recently the United Nations Secretary General's Five Point Plan 
included a provision for an agreement or framework of agreements to this end, and reference 
to this was included in the draft 2009 NPT Prep Com documents. In addition, Austria, Costa 
Rica, India and Malaysia have indicated their support for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.344 
Regardless of the arguments for and against a nuclear weapons convention (or framework of 
disarmament agreements), a process lead by middle powers in this direction would not be 
feasible or desirable in the foreseeable future. Middle powers are better equipped to focus on 
short term and achievable aims and prepare the ground for later disarmament momentum. 
Research limitations 
This research has ultimately been limited on a number of fronts. Detailed analysis has been 
lost in an attempt to cover a broad range of middle power coalitions. Therefore future 
research could consider the drivers of middle power state disarmament advocacy and the 
coalition strategies in more detail. This thesis proposed that middle power states are more 
effective when acting in coalition rather than individual efforts and that this coalition activity 
is both reasonable and likely; however as Chapter Six suggests, not all middle power states 
tend towards this type of diplomatic engagement. Future research could consider other 
disarmament strategies (outside ofthe coalition), the individual contribution of middle 
powers to nuclear disarmament. Despite the case built in this thesis, there are other options 
for middle powers. Ko Colijn, in a discussion of middle power efforts in the WMD regimes 
in the past decade, suggests that "the gains from acting in concert in permanent institutions-
and in particular negotiated rather than imposed ones - may far exceed the gains from the ad 
hoc success of small or medium powers acting solo or in the framework of ad hoc 
coalitions.,,345 Furthermore, he suggests that middle powers are best able to playa role 
343 New Agenda Coalition, Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World - the Need for a New 
344 "General and complete disarmament: follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice 
on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, "United Nations First Committee, Sixty-second 
session (October 2006) submitted by Algeria, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kuwait, Lao 
People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Qatar, Singapore, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand and Viet Nam. 
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through plurilateral initiatives to 'augment' permanent institutions, such as the Proliferation 
Security Initiative and the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.346 
Conclusion 
This thesis set out to consider whether middle power states, such as those involved in the NAC, 
were effective advocates of the emerging international norm of nuclear disarmament when 
acting in coalition with other like-minded middle powers. This thesis found that the influence 
of middle power nuclear disarmament advocates is ultimately constrained by the dynamics of 
international politics. Thesis built a case to support the hypothesis by suggesting that that the 
NAC is one example of a larger trend in international disarmament diplomacy of using 
middle power coalitions to generate disarmament momentum. Using a template of moderator 
variables as a guide for analysis this research identified and compared the various diplomatic 
strategies employed in these initiatives and assessed the capacity of these states to develop 
the case for nuclear disarmament, persuasively reject or rebut opposing arguments, and 
constrain the nuclear policies of more powerful states. This thesis found that the coalition 
approach has been widely useful platform for middle power advocacy and that within certain 
clearly defined parameters these strategies could be applicable in the context of nuclear 
disarmament. The primary contribution of this research however, has been the identification 
of the factors that future middle power coalitions should take into account when engaging in 
disarmament advocacy. 
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